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The dominant definition and framework for the analysis
of corruption – which then informs or misleads the ways
to address corruption -- is much too narrow a definition
and itself a construct of the systemic abuse of economic
power as it presents itself today in the world. Ours is a
global justice perspective and our objective is to place
corruption in the contemporary context of corporate
globalization. We wish to reach important constituencies
outraged about corruption and help channel that
understanding into a broader movement that tackles
corruption at the root and structural level, and not simply
in a few corporate-friendly limited expressions.
We view corruption as a process facilitated by institutions
and economic interests, and not simply single acts
by single individuals chiefly in the South. With this in
mind, we articulate a broader and more contemporary
understanding of corruption that can help people,
victims in particular, account for many of the daily
economic injustices suffered.
Alejandro Bendaña is Chair of the Centro de Estudios
Internacionales in Managua, Nicaragua and a member
of the International Coordinating Committees of Jubilee
South and the International South Group Network.
International South Group Network
JUBILEE SOUTH
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Head of Government Estimated Funds  Allegedly Embezzled
Mohamed Suharto 
President of Indonesia, 1967-98
US$ 15 to 35 billion
Ferdinand Marcos 
President of Philippines, 1972-86
US$ 5 to 10 billion
Mobutu Sese Seko,  
President of Zaire, 1965-97
US$ 5 billion 
Sani Abacha  
President of Nigeria, 1993-98
US$ 2 to 5 billion 
Slobodan Milosevic 




President of Haiti, 1971-86
US$ 300 to 800 million
Alberto Fujimori 
President of Peru, 1990-2000
US$ 600 million
What’s	 wrong	 with	 this	 picture?	 	We	 have	 no	 quarrel	 with	 the	
selection	of	the	scoundrels—money	stolen	having	a	smaller	value	
than	 the	 lives	 of	 the	 thousands	murdered	 under	 their	 regimes.	
The	report’s	compiler,	Transparency	International,	is	the	premiere	
international	 nongovernmental	 network	 working	 against	
 Compiled by Transparency International, Global Corruption Report,
   http://www.transparency.org/publications/gcr/download_gcr/ 
   download_gcr_2004
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corruption,	 although	 its	mandate	 is	not	 limited	 to	 the	South,	or	
to	 accusing	 individuals.	 	The	problem	 is	 not	 the	 authorship	but	





•	 Why	only	 individuals?	 	Are	we	 to	 infer	 that	corporations	
and	institutions	are	above	malfeasance?
•	 Why	is	the	nation	state	taken	as	the	unit	of	analysis?		Are	


















is	 either	 not	 performing	 duties	 it	was	 originally	 intended	 to,	 or	
performing	 them	 in	 an	 improper	 way,	 to	 the	 detriment	 of	 the	
system’s	original	purpose.		According	to	Wikepedia,	specific	types	
of	corruption	include	political	corruption	(corruption	of	a	political	
system	 where	 public	 officials	 seek	 illegitimate	 personal	 gain	
through	 actions	 such	 as	 bribery,	 extortion,	 cronyism,	 nepotism,	
2 Webster’s Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary.





Stiaan	 van	 der	 Merwe,	 the	 founding	 Chief	 Executive	 Officer	 of	
Transparency	 South	 Africa,	 explains	 how	“the	 word	 ‘corruption’,	
as	 explained	 in	 a	 dictionary,	 can	 be	 used	 to	 refer	 to	 anything	
unethical	 or	 for	 whatever	 is	 wrong	 in	 the	 world.	 	 However,	 for	
strategic	 purposes,	 legislation	 and	 procedures	 in	 organisations,	
some	parameters	of	or	 limitation	in	meaning	need	to	be	agreed	
to.	 	 If	 everything	bad	constitutes	 corruption,	 the	word	becomes	
meaningless	for	all	practical	purposes	and	we	could	face	a	situation	
in	which	nothing	is	eventually	done	about	it.”3
We	 could	 of	 course	 throw	 out	 the	 word	 corruption	 and	 call	 a	
spade	a	spade:	exploitation,	larceny,	crime,	etc.		But	ours	is	a	global	
justice	perspective	and	our	objective	is	to	place	corruption	in	the	
contemporary	 context	 of	 corporate	 globalisation.	 	 We	 wish	 to	
reach	 important	 constituencies	 outraged	 about	 corruption	 and	















 Stiaan van der Merwe, Combat Corruption Collectively, Mobilizing South  
   African Civil Society on Corruption, governance and Ethics, (Transparency  
   South Africa, Pretoria: 200), p. 8.  Much of the theoretical discussion presented 
   here draws on this important study.
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against	it	in	a	more	holistic	manner.		There	is	no	single	blueprint,	
but	 in	all	 cases	 its	 strategies	can	be	 linked	 to	broader	 struggles	
to	create	new	spaces	for	democratic	discussion	and	new	forms	of	
decision-making.	
Our	 perspective	 welcomes	 the	 inclusion	 of	 moral	 and	 ethical	
considerations	 derived	 from	 the	 contemporary	workings	 of	 the	
global	political	 economy.	 	 Specifically,	 to	 explore	 the	 corruption	
inherent	 in	 the	 relationship	between	 the	marginalisation	of	 the	
majority	of	the	world’s	inhabitants	and	the	historically	unparalleled	
global	 concentration	 of	 power	 and	 wealth.	 	 We	 propose	 an	








attempt	 to	 broaden	 the	 scope	 of	 anti-corruption	 consideration	
and	action.		
If	 we	 are	 serious	 about	 eradicating	 corruption,	 let	 us	 do	 so	




justice	 and	 self-determination?	 	This	 essay	 is	 a	brief	preliminary	
effort,	sponsored	by	the	International	Initiative	on	Corruption	and	
Governance	 (IICG)4,	 to	scrutinize	 the	 issue	of	corruption	and	 the	





particularly	 as	 to	 how	 markets	 and	 societies	 should	 interact	
and	how	nations	should	and	can	develop.	 	Here	we	will	explore	
therefore	 how	 the	 ideology	 of	 the	 dominante	 anti-corruption	






the	heart	of	 the	net	outflow	of	 resources	 from	the	South	to	 the	
North—that	is,	the	greatest	economic	crime	of	our	time.5
 An earlier version of this study appears in International Initiative on Corruption  
  and Governance, The People Speak on Corruption and Governance, Vol. 7,
  (IBON Books, Manila, 2007).  

FIGHTING CORRUPTION: A NON-CORPORATE PERSPECTIVE

FIGHTING CORRUPTION: A NON-CORPORATE PERSPECTIVE
II.   Taking the Lid off Corruption:
 An Incomplete Process
The	mainstream	definition	of	corruption	is	summarised	in	a	simple	
formula:
Corruption (C) = Monopoly (M) + Discretion (D) – Accountability (A)
The	formula	helps	account	for	the	stellar	selection	of	individuals	
presented	 at	 the	 beginning.	 	 That	 picture	 reflects	 and	 seeks	 to	
reinforce	the	view	that	corruption	 is	almost	exclusively	 found	 in	
the	public	sector.		That	is,	government	departments,	civil	servants	
and	 politicians	 who	 abuse	 their	 alleged	 “monopoly”	 of	 public	





The	 conservative	 approach	 only	 deals	 with	 certain	 forms	 of	
corruption,	principally	individual	acts	of	bribery	and	extortion	in	
the	public	sector	(or	where	it	intersects	with	the	private	sector,	as	
in	 the	case	of	contracts	and	procurement).	 	Under	 this	 legalistic	
framework,	fighting	corruption	is	chiefly	the	task	of	state	agencies,	
increasingly	with	support	 from	civil	 society,	 the	World	Bank	and	





corruption	 and	 enhancing	 transparency	 in	 government.	 	 Most	
of	 the	 attention	 is	 focused	 on	 the	 actions,	 prosecution	 and	
punishment	 of	 politicians	 and	 government	 officials	 involved	 in	
bribe-taking,	kickback	 schemes,	 favouritism,	embezzlement,	 	 etc.	






sector.	 	 It	 is	 real	and	growing.	 	Given	the	expanding	dimensions	
of	 international	 crime	networks,	much	work	 is	also	necessary	 to	




on	 the	 international	 agenda.	 	 Under	 the	 Presidency	 of	 James	
Wolfensohn,	 the	 World	 Bank	 took	 on	 the	 dreaded	 “C-word,”	
winning	 praise	 for	 having	 lifted	 the	 lid	 on	 the	 discussion	 of	
corruption	 in	 a	 development	 context.	 	 Critics,	 however,	 insisted	
that	 the	Bank	also	 look	at	 itself.	 	 In	1996,	 the	World	Bank	finally	
introduced	 a	 new	 provision	 into	 its	 procurement	 guidelines	 to	
address	 fraud	 and	 corruption,	 with	 penalties	 for	 firms	 found	 to	
have	acted	fraudulently.
But	 the	 lid	 was	 not	 removed	 completely	 and	 the	 discussion	
remained	safely	circumscribed.		Writing	for	Corner	House	in	2000,	
Susan	Hawley	noted	how	“Most	 commentators	on	corruption—
and	 on	 the	“good	 governance”	 initiatives	 instigated	 to	 combat	
it—dwell	on	developing	countries,	not	 industrialised	ones.	Most	
scrutinise	politically-lax	cultures	in	the	South,	not	the	North.		Most	
call	 attention	 to	 the	 petty	 corruption	 of	 low-paid	 civil	 servants,	










may	 just	be	 too	cold	 for	 comfort.	 	As	 such,	 these	 role-players	 in	
the	anti-corruption	drive	become	part	of	the	overall	problem	and	
need	to	be	cited	as	such.”7		
 Susan Hawley, “Exporting Corruption: Privatization, Multinationals and 
   Bribery,” Corner House Briefing No. 19, http://www.thecornerhouse.org. 
   uk/item.shtml?x=5197
7 Van der Merwe, Combating Corruption,2
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Power	and	power	relations	are	no	doubt	also	at	play	in	the	shaping	
of	anti-corruption	campaigns,	placing	strict	limitations	on	areas	of	






as	 from	apartheid,	where	corruption	was	embedded	 in	 the	very	
nature	of	the	regime.		A	narrow	anti-corruption	campaign	against	




individuals	 cited	 at	 the	beginning	were	 chased	out	 of	 office	by	





behaviour	 of	 people	 in	 colonialism	 and	 apartheid	 that	 finalised	
the	picture	 of	 corruption.	 	These	were	 indeed	massive	 forms	 of	






for	 punishment	 of	 official	 wrong-doers.	 	 The	 understanding	 is	
fundamentally	 political	 as	 evidenced	 in	 abuses	 of	 power,	 both	
political	 and	 economic,	 by	 both	 national	 and	 international	
entities.		
Another	 linkage	 conveniently	 ignored	by	 the	 conservative	 anti-
corruption	 movement	 is	 the	 ongoing	 connection	 between	
governing	 elites	 and	 transnational	 corporations	 (TNCs)	 and	
International	 Financial	 Institutions	 (IFIs)	 in	 order	 to	 extract	
  Van der Merwe, Combating Corruption, p. 19-20.
resources	 from	 peoples,	 including	 national	 natural	 resources.	
Pillage	and	looting	is	a	form	of	corruption	as	old	as	the	empires	
that	practiced	them.		Incalculable	riches	in	the	form	of	resources	
and	human	 lives—from	gold	 to	 rubber	 to	oil—were	 taken	 from	
peoples	 and	 continents	 that	 have	 yet	 to	 fully	 recover,	 let	 alone	
forget,	 the	 advent	 of	 the	 private/public	 colonial	 onslaughts.	
During	 the	Cold	War,	 a	number	of	 kleptocratic	 regimes	enjoyed	
full	 support	 from	 their	Western	 patrons	 with	 considerations	 of	
corruption	 and	democracy	 conveniently	 set	 aside.	 	None	of	 the	




anti-corruption	agenda.	 	 It	needs	 to	 take	account	of	 the	parallel	
shift	 in	 power	 from	 the	 public	 to	 the	 private	 sector	 supported	
by	 rich	 country	 governments	 interested	 in	 the	“privatisation”	 of	







calling	 for	 increased	 public	 scrutiny	 and	 disclosure.	 	 Thus,	 just	
when	most	has	been	said	(although	not	necessarily	done)	about	
transparency	 in	 government,	 transparency	 in	 the	 profit-making	




appropriate	World	Bank-advised	steps	 to	 legalise	 the	 transfer	of	
resources	and	abdication	of	regulatory	powers.		Systemic	corruption	
occurs	 where	 governments	 and	 organisational	 procedures	 are	
compromised	in	a	way	that	permits	or	even	feeds	the	individual	
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entities	on	national	 ones.	 	 Regulation	 and	 control	 of	 corruption	
is	 still,	 in	 principle,	 a	 governmental	matter,	 but	 that	 principle	 is	
weakened	 when	 government	 is	 ideologically	 and	 functionally	
stripped	 of	 supervisory	 power.	 	While	 there	 is	 still	 a	 degree	 of	
regulation	in	the	rich	countries	and	some	developing	ones,	this	is	
not	the	case	for	most	poorer	countries	where,	as	part	of	the	same	




Evidently	 the	 now-dominant	 neoliberal	 understanding	 of	 the	
role	 of	 government	 dovetails	 perfectly	with	 the	 dominant	 view	
of	 public	 sector	 corruption	 that	 can	 be	 cured	 by	 privatisation.	
Empirical	 evidence	 notwithstanding,	 neoliberal	 partisans	
insisted	that	the	market	was	the	best	regulator.		In	fact,	however,	
we	 witness	 monopolistic	 power	 imposing	 itself	 on	 the	 market.	






Under	 the	 guise	 of	 globalisation,	 market	 sovereignty	 is	
overtaking	 national	 sovereignty;	 markets	 are	 shaping	 politics	
and	 political	 behaviour.	 	 Power	 flows	 to	 unelected	 institutions,	
be	 they	private	 corporations	or	 entities	 such	as	 the	World	Bank	
and	the	International	Monetary	Fund,	which	are	also	immune	to	
democratic	political	processes.		This	dimension	is	virtually	ignored	





of	market-centered	and	 the	World	Bank	 in	particular,	where	 the	
interests	 of	 rich	 country	 bankers	 and	 corporations,	 and	 their	




Capitalist	 ideology	 defends	 privatisation,	 deregulation	 and	
liberalisation,	 notwithstanding	mounting	 evidence	 of	 the	 harm	
that	multinationals	and	national	monopolistic	entities	can	cause	
to	the	lives	of	ordinary	citizens,	their	environment	and	their	right	
to	 self-determination.	 	 Water,	 health	 services,	 transportation,	
waste	collection,	telecommunications,	financial	services	and	even	
security	are	being	absorbed	by	an	unaccountable	“for	profit”	sector.	
Restoring	accountability	does	not	 entail	 a	 return	 to	 Soviet-style	




The	 point	 is	 to	 take	 account	 of	 new	 dimensions	 of	 corruption	
in	 the	discussion	and	action	plans.	 	That	being	said,	 recognition	
must	 be	 given	 to	 agencies	 such	 as	 Transparency	 International	
and	other	bodies	for	having	opened	the	debate	in	the	first	place.	
Now	we	need	 to	go	beyond	 the	proverbial	 tip	of	 the	 iceberg—
individual	acts	of	graft	or	embezzlement	of	a	public	treasury.		Not	
shifting	at	this	point	can	become	counterproductive	for	the	entire	










the	 international	 economic	 order,	 displacement	 of	 employment	
and	 control	 of	 scarce	 natural	 resources	 all	 continue	 to	 increase.	
Inequality,	dishonesty,	unfairness,	injustice	and	exploitation	must	all	
form	part	of	a	broader	anti-corruption	discourse	and	mobilisation.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 it	 becomes	 imperative	 to	 underscore	 the	
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We	 need	 to	 contest	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 public	 sector	 is	
inherently	 and	 inevitably	 corrupt—and	 that	 the	 private	 sector	









the	 injustice	 and	 corruption	 that	 characterise	 the	 transfer	 of	
resources	from	poor	to	rich,	from	the	global	South	to	the	global	
North.	 	No	matter	 how	 legalised,	 there	 is	 a	 fundamental	 lack	of	
integrity	and	morality	in	any	system	or	mechanism	that	enforces	
this	extraction.		It	is	a	matter	of	record	that	there	is	a	net	extraction	
from	 the	 South—call	 it	 exploitation	 or	 surplus	 extraction—in	
amounts	significantly	 larger	 than	the	 inflow	generated	by	trade,	
aid,	direct	 investment	and	even	remittances.	 	 If	 the	current	anti-
corruption	discourse	does	not	want	to	lose	its	credibility,	a	first	step	
is	to	acknowledge	the	absence	of	a	level	international	economic	
playing	field.	 	That	field	 is	not	divinely-ordained	by	 the	“market”	
but	has	been	constructed	by	particular	actors	and	is	defended	by	
the	most	powerful	governments	in	the	world.		
A	persistent	bleeding	of	 resources	 from	the	South	 to	 the	North,	
from	poor	to	rich,	constitutes	perhaps	the	most	perverse	form	of	
modern	 corruption—it	 demands	 identification,	 quantification,	
advocacy,	 adjudication	 of	 individual	 responsibilities	 and	





are	 considered	 normal	 and	 certainly	 not	 illegal.	 	 Yet	 corporate	
power	 has	 rigged	 the	 international	 financial	 and	 trade	 regime.	
Far	 from	 reflecting	a	 legal	 compact	of	 the	equality	of	 sovereign	





Ending	 corruption	 would	 entail	 the	 construction	 of	 resource	
redistribution	 mechanisms	 such	 as	 the	 Tobin	 tax	 and	 other	
measures	being	proposed.		Ostensibly,	international	bodies	should	










realpolitik	 in	defence	of	competing	national	 interests.	 	This	begs	
the	question	of	who	determines	what	is	national	interest—indeed	
a	measure	of	democracy	 itself,	 if	 and	when	highly	concentrated	
economic	 power	 is	 held	 in	 check	 by	 a	 human	 rights-grounded	
social	compact.		In	the	longer	term,	a	true	anti-corruption	struggle	
would	work	to	make	such	 international	private	and	 institutional	
practices	 illegal	 and	 punishable.	 	 For	 now,	 it	 is	 important	 to	
challenge	the	corruption	discourse	along	with	the	interventionist	
apparatus	 it	has	created—the	 latest	 instalment	 in	 the	history	of	
mision	civilizatrize.		How	does	that	theory	and	practice	face	up	to	




Transparency	 International—the	 two	 focal	 points	 of	 the	 anti-
corruption	 “movement”—insist	 on	 focusing	 on	 public	 sector	
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Corporations	wrote	the	first	chapter	of	the	corruption/governance	
manual	insisting	that	corrupt	public	officials	unfairly	“tax”	foreign	
(and	 domestic)	 direct	 investment.	 	 Their	 argument	 goes	 on	 to	
declare,	 almost	 axiomatically,	 that	 private	 investment	 must	 be	
protected	 against	 graft	 because	 investment	 means	 economic	
growth	and	growth	benefits	the	poor.		No	room	is	given	to	those	
expressing	doubts	 about	 the	 effectiveness	of	 the	holy	 trinity	of	
private	 investment-economic	 growth-poverty	 reduction	 that	
insists	 that	 privatisation	 and	 liberalisation	 will	 allow	 poorer	
countries	to	better	“compete”	in	what	is	considered	the	inevitable	






any	 economic	 growth	 translate	 into	 social	 development?	 	 How	
are	 the	 poor	 as	 a	whole	 to	 benefit	 by	 their	 countries’	 insertion	
into	 the	 global	 neoliberal	 economy?	 	 The	 discussion	 would	 be	
a	substantive	one,	but	 in	the	following	pages	we	can	only	make	
a	 small	 contribution	 by	 reviewing	 how	 neoliberal	 corruption	
takes	 place	 in	 a	 series	 of	 practices,	 transactions,	 processes	 and	
structures.		
Antonio	Tujan,	 Jr.	of	 the	 IBON	Foundation	 in	Phillippines	 .	 states,	
“The	 issues	 of	 corruption	 and	 bad	 governance	 are	 of	 genuine	
concern	 to	 the	 people	 not	 only	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 they	 siphon	
off	 precious	 resources	 for	 development	 and	 social	 services,	 but	
more	 so	 because	 the	 problem	 of	 corruption	 and	 the	 issue	 of	
undemocratic	governance	 is	also	at	 the	heart	of	 the	problem	of	
mal-development,	poverty	and	injustice….		The	issue	of	corruption	
and	governance	cannot	be	comprehended	purely	on	a	national	




9    American Broadcasting Network (ABC) News, December 15, 2006.
0 Antonio Tujan, Jr., editor, The People Speak on Corruption & Governance,  
     (International Initiative on Corruption and Governance/IBON, Manila: 200), v.
III.  Corporate Corruption
In	 Latin	 America	 there	 is	 a	 debate	 about	whether,	 in	 real	 value	
terms,	the	“Golden	Age	of	Pillage”	took	place	with	the	looting	of	
gold	and	silver	 in	16th	and	17th	century,	or	whether	that	amount	
is	 exceeded	 by	 what	 has	 been	 extracted	 in	 the	 last	 40	 years.	






European	 multinational	 corporations	 and	 banks.	 	 Presidential	
decrees	 bypassed	 congress	 and	 the	 electorate	 and	 dictated	 a	
privileged	 place	 for	 foreign	 capital.	 	 Protests	 by	 Congress,	 the	
electorate	and	national	auditors	were	ignored.”11






public	 enterprises—banks,	 power	 plants,	 telecommunications,	
roads,	 water	 and	 transport	 services—to	 foreign	 entities.	 	 Total	
private	 takeovers	 rose	 to	 US$360.5	 billion	 by	 2001—a	 full	 150	
billion	more	than	the	next	most	“attractive”	region,	the	East	Asia	
Pacific.		More	firms	were	sold	and	more	money	was	raised	in	Latin	
America	 than	 in	 almost	 any	other	part	 of	 the	world.	 	The	 result	
was	not	only	a	decrease	in	economic	policy	autonomy	but	also	an	
increase	in	poverty,	unemployment	and	inequality:
•	 In	 Argentina,	 150,000	 workers	 were	 dismissed	 due	 to	
privatisations	between	1987	and	1997;	
•	 About	50	percent	of	all	 employees	 in	firms	privatised	 in	
Mexico	lost	their	jobs;
 James Petras, “Is Latin America Really Turning Left?,” (June, 200), 
     www.globalresearch.org
v
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for	 liberalisation	 and	 privatisation-friendly	 “good	 governance”	
is	underway.	 	With	the	support	of	the	World	Bank,	South	African	





from	 civil	 society	 and	 academic	movements	 over	 the	 past	 two	
decades….	 	 Included	in	these	policies	are	commitments,	among	
others,	to	fully	participatory	democratic	policy-making,	rejection	
of	 the	 privatisation	 of	 public	 services,	 redirection	 of	 resources	
from	the	private	to	the	public	sector,	debt	repudiation,	increased	
exchange	 controls,	 protection	 of	 vital	 infant	 industries,	 greater	




2 Center for Global Development, Policy Brief, “Privatization in Latin
     America,” www.dgdev.org.
 Alberto Chong, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, “The Truth about Privatization 
     in Latin America,” Inter-American Development Bank,  http://www.iadb.org/ 
     res/publications/pubfiles/pubr-46.pdf
4 Antonia Juhasz, “NEPAD: Foothold for Corporate Globalization in Africa,”  
     Interim Report, Intrinsic Consequences of Economic Globalization on the  
     Environment, International Forum on Globalization, 
     http://www.thebushagenda.net/article.php?id=9
“Corruption	 by	 western	 multinationals	 is	 a	 disease	 all	 over	
Africa,”	says	Churuchill	Maqutu	of	Lesotho’s	High	Court.		Maqutu	
was	 a	 public	 prosecutor	 who	 sued	 some	 of	 the	world’s	 largest	
engineering	companies	for	fraud	in	a	World	Bank-promoted	water	
project,	 the	 largest	of	 its	 kind	 in	Africa.	 	 Funders	of	 the	Lesotho	
Highland	Water	 Project	 included	 the	World	 Bank;	 the	 European	
Investment	 Bank;	 the	 German,	 British	 and	 French	 bilateral	 aid	
agencies;	and	the	UK	Commonwealth	Development	Corporation.	
Participating	 commercial	 banks	 included	 Banque	 Nationale	 de	
Paris,	 Dresdner	 and	Hill	 Samuel;	 and	 a	 number	 of	 export	 credit	





Apparently,	 not	 one	 of	 the	 donor	 funding	 agencies	 scrutinized	




themselves.	 	 Leaked	 correspondence	 between	 the	World	 Bank	
and	 the	 Lesotho	 government	 suggests	 that	 the	 Bank	 knew	 of	
corruption	allegations	against	Masupha	Sole,	the	former	director	
of	 the	 Lesotho	Highlands	Development	Authority	 charged	with	
taking	bribes	as	far	back	as	1994.		But	the	Bank’s	reaction	was	to	
berate	 Lesotho	 government	 authorities	 for	 having	 suspended	
Sole,	 arguing	 that	 the	 dismissal	 would	 interfere	 with	 project	
construction	timetables	and	could	lead	to	costly	overruns.15
Botswana’s	 lead	 prosecutor	 took	 the	 case	 directly	 to	 the	 donor	
governments	 and	 funding	 agencies	 only	 to	 be	 met	 with	
“considerable	 scepticism	 and	 even	 arrogance,”	 according	 to	 a	
United	Nations	official	who	 followed	 the	case.	 	Testifying	before	
the	 US	 Foreign	 Relations	 Committee	 that	 same	 year,	 Penzhorn	
warned	 that	“there	 is	 a	 lingering	 impression	 in	 Lesotho,	 as	well	
as	in	South	Africa,	that	the	interest	of	first	world	countries	in	the	
 Nicholas Hildyard, “The Lesotho Highland Water Project,” 
     http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/corrupt/lesotho.htm
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present	prosecutions	lies	not	so	much	in	the	successful	outcome	
of	 these	 prosecutions	 but	 rather	 in	 protecting	 the	 interests	 of	




Until	 recently,	 the	 rich	 countries,	 including	 France,	 Germany,	
Switzerland	 and	 Japan,	 allowed	 companies	 to	 deduct	 bribes	
to	 foreign	public	officials	as	 legitimate	expenses.	 	 In	 the	case	of	
Japan	 the	 metaphor	 was	 “entertainment	 and	 social	 expenses.”	




secrecy	 for	 those	 suspected	 of	 terrorism,	 but	 less	 so	 for	 those	
guilty	 of	 bribery	 or	 corporate	money	 laundering.	 	 According	 to	













positive	 impact	 on	 actual	 standards	 of	 international	 business	
conduct	of	American	corporations	collectively,	at	least	with	respect	
 Quoted in Sebastian Levine, former Senior Economist with UNDP, “Taking on  
     the Goliaths of corruption”, Eldis Document Store,  http://www.eldis.org/cf/rdr/ 
     rdr.cfm?doc=DOC22
7 Mathew McClearn, “African Advantage: The Lesotho Highland Water  
     Project,” Canadian Business Journal, September 2, 200, Halifax Initiative  
     website, http://www.halifaxinitiative.org/index.php/PressResponses_World/ 
     ARTf42a00b778
to	 the	bribery	of	 foreign	public	officials.”18	 	A	 former	US	Federal	
Reserve	Chairman	warned	that	“corporate	greed	 [had]	exploded	
beyond	anything	that	could	have	been	imagined	in	1990.”		Former	





time	 in	 the	 late	 1990’s	 when	 self-certitude	 and	 spin	 became	 a	








companies	 across	 the	 business	 landscape	 in	 the	 1990’s....	 	 That	





There	 is	 no	 dividing	 line	 between	 corruption	 at	 home	 and	 the	
corruption	practiced	abroad	by	the	same	corporations.	 	A	World	
Bank-co-sponsored	 study	 on	 Transnational	 Corporations	 (TNC)	
and	corruption	in	resource-rich	“transition	economies”	concluded	
that	“it	is	suggestive	that	FDI	(foreign	direct	investment)	originating	
8 DAC Network on Governance, Synthesis of Lessons Learned of Donor 
     Practices in Fighting Corruption,” DAC/DAC?GOVNET (200), 2 June,  
     200. p. 24.
19 Quoted by Robert H. Wade, “Questions of Fairness: In Search of a Just 
     International Economic Orderm,” Foreign Affairs, (September/October 200),  
     Vol. 8, No. , p..
20 Kurt Eichenwald, “Verdict on an Era: Arrogance and Recklessness at Enron,”  
     The New York Times,   May 2, 200 (full text of article in Annex ).
2 Ibid.
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in	 the	United	States—which	has	been	governed	by	 the	Foreign	
Corrupt	Practices	Act	 for	more	 than	20	 years—does	not	 appear	
to	be	characterised	by	higher	standards	of	corporate	ethics	than	
domestic	firms	or	FDI	originating	in	other	countries....”22
One	 difference	 between	 corruption	 at	 home	 and	 corruption	
abroad	was	that	the	international	operations	of	many	of	the	same	
corporate	culprits	 received	explicit	government	and	multilateral	
support.	 	 The	 International	 Financial	 Institutions	 (IFI),	 including	
the	World	 Bank,	 the	 Inter-American	Development	 Bank	 and	 the	
Asian	 Development	 Bank,	 among	 others,	 operate	 programmes	









Much	 the	 same	 corruption-prone	 institutionalised	 collusion	
is	 standard	 practice	 in	 the	 Asian	 Development	 Bank	 (ADB).	 	 In	
line	 with	 Anglo-American	 neoliberal	 ideology	 that	 holds	 sway	










for	 ADB	 contracts	 were	 established	 in	 the	 1970s	 and	 1980s	
22 Joel Hellman, et. al., “Are Foreign Investors and Multinationals Engaging in  
     Corrupt Practices in Transition Economies?,” Transition, (May-June-July,  
     2000), p. 7.
2 IPS’ new report, Enron’s Pawns: How Public Institutions Bankrolled Enron’s  






In	 Washington,	 as	 elsewhere,	 the	 longstanding	 and	 lucrative	
revolving	 door	 relationships	 between	 government	 and	
corporations	 has	 reached	 unprecedented	 levels,	 according	 to	
observers.		A	study	by	an	intrepid	New	York	Times	reporter	in	2001	
revealed	 the	dealings	of	 the	Carlyle	Group,	 a	 $12	billion	private	
equity	company	whose	roster	 included	former	top	officials	 from	
the	 Bush	 and	 Reagan	 administrations,	 including	 George	 Bush	
Sr.	 and	his	 former	 Secretary	of	 State,	 James	Baker	 3rd,	 and	Frank	
Carlucci,	 former	 secretary	 of	 defence	 under	 Ronald	 Reagan,	 as	








taken	 the	 practice	 global.	 	 Private	 equity	 involves	 buying	 up	
companies	 and	 reselling	 them	 to	 very	 rich	 investors	 at	 a	 high	
profit.”	 	The	Carlyle	empire	 spans	 three	 continents	 and	 includes	
investments	 from	and	 in	numerous	countries.	 	According	to	this	
report,	 Carlyle	 owned	 so	many	 companies	 that	 in	 effect	 it	 had	
become	one	of	the	biggest	US	defence	contractors	and	a	force	in	
global	telecommunications.	Obviously	the	firm	benefited	greatly	
from	 the	 contacts	 of	 many	 former	 government	 officials.	 	 “The	
steady	flow	of	politicians	to	lucrative	private-sector	jobs	based	on	
their	government	contacts	 is	a	 familiar	Washington	 tale..	 	But	 in	
this	case,	it	is	being	played	out	for	more	dollars,	on	a	global	stage,	
and	in	the	world	of	private	finance,	where	the	minimal	government	
24 Chris Jones, “The Asian Development Bank, Capital Flows and the 
     Privatization of Infrastructure Projects in the South,” in Focus on the Global  
     South, Profiting from Poverty: the ADB, Private Sector and Development in  
     Asia, (Bangkok: 200).
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rules	prohibiting	 lobbying	by	 former	officials	 for	 a	given	period	
are	not	a	factor.		These	rules	say	nothing	about	potential	conflicts	
when	 former	 government	 officials	 use	 their	 connection	 and	
insights	for	financial	gain.”25		
In	the	light	of	corporate	collusion	in	the	North,	it	is	not	surprising	
that	 the	World	Bank	and	 the	corporate-dominated	 international	
and	 national	 boards	 of	 Transparency	 International	 remain	
tightly	focused	on	South	government	public	sector	“supply	side”	
corruption.	 	 Prosecuting	 illicit	 bribery	 is	 still	 the	 chief	 priority	
and	 there	 is	no	 significant	 inclination	 to	 look	 critically	 at	 FDI	 as	
a	whole	with	 its	 legal	and	 illicit	 linkages	to	political	power.	 	This	
is	 in	 keeping	 with	 the	 G8	 neoliberal	 market	 fundamentalism	
that	dictates	that	FDI	(i.e.,	TNCs	and	finance	capital)	is	the	virtual	
silver	 bullet	 that	will	 deliver	 development.	 	That	message	 came	





Officials	 promised	 a	 $5	 billion	 increase	 in	 assistance,	 but	 that	
increase	was,	as	one	commentator	put	 it,	“totally	overshadowed	
by	two	other	haunting	statistics:	the	$800	billion	spent	on	military	
budgets	 worldwide	 in	 2002,	 and	 the	 $200	 billion	 net	 transfer	
of	 financial	 resources	 from	 the	 South	 to	 the	 North.	 	 UNCTAD	
corroborated	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 flow	 of	 net	 resources	 was	 the	
largest	 ever	 from	 the	 world’s	 poorer	 nations	 to	 the	 rich.	 	 UN	




being	 transferred	 abroad:	 “If	 what	 we	 say	 about	 financing	 for	




2 Leslie Wayne, “For the Old Bush Team, A Whole New Ballgame,” 
     International Herald Tribune, March , 200.
2 Thalif Deen, “Rich Nations Broke Aid Pledge,” Third World Network, 









Government	 itself	 must	 be	 attractive	 to	 investors,	 according	
to	 market	 fundamentalists.	 	 At	 Monterrey	 and	 at	 subsequent	
conferences,	South	governments	meekly	accepted	the	assumption	
that	 they,	 not	 history	 or	 international	 context,	were	 responsible	
for	 the	sorry	state	of	 their	countries.	 	Donors	claimed	they	were	
suffering	 from	“aid	 fatigue,”	 telling	 stories	of	 South	government	
corruption	 and	 demanding	 new	“governance”	 that	 could	 make	
the	countries	worthy	of	 aid	and,	more	 importantly,	of	 corporate	
investment	with	corollary	guarantees	for	profit	remittances.		
“Advancing	 investor	 opportunities”—a	 core	 feature	 of	 “good	
governance”—is	 itself	 fraught	 with	 new	 opportunities	 to	 cheat	
and	 extort.	 	 Concern	 for	malfeasance	was	 limited	 to	 the	 public	
sector,	 leaving	 the	 TNCs	 and	 others	 with	 a	 wide-open	 door	 to	
enjoy	 and	 abuse	 the	 benefits	 of	 liberalisation	 and	 privatisation.	
In	 the	 race	 to	 compete	 for	 Foreign	Direct	 Investment	 (FDI)	 and	
World	Bank	approval,	poor	countries	 tripped	over	each	other	 to	
provide	enhanced	benefits	 for	 investors	even	at	 the	expense	of	
social	 rights	 and	 environmental	 sustainability.	 	 Governments	
themselves	 proved	 incapable	 of	 controlling	 many	 TNCs	 and	
subjecting	 them	 to	 national	 laws	 and	 regulations,	 including	
appropriate	supervision	in	order	to	arrange	proper	tax	collections.	
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including	 national	 ones,	 demand	 and	 receive	 tax	 holidays	 and	
breaks,	 subsidies,	 guarantees,	 exemptions	 from	 regulations,	
including	 environmental	 and	 labour	 standards—all	 in	 the	 spirit	
of	countries	becoming	“competitive”	 in	 their	 race	 to	 the	bottom	
in	 social	 terms.	 	 A	 recent	 Botswana	 government	 advertisement	
boasted	that	“Botswana	has	reduced	corporate	taxes,	which	at	15	










of	 taxation	 for	 non-domestic	 enterprises.	 	 Setting	 aside	 notions	
of	 transparency	 and	 fairness,	 corporations	 engage	 in	 deliberate	
mis-pricing	 of	 their	 products	 and	 services	 to	 escape	 national	








in	balance	of	payments	 terms	but,	more	 importantly,	 in	 a	grave	
undermining	of	national	capacities	 to	apply	 laws	and	standards	
in	 the	 country	 at	 large,	 as	many	 foreign	 operations	 claim	 to	 be	
above	the	law.		In	a	non-contentious	scheme,	the	question	remains	
whether	short-term	gains	from	investment	are	offset	by	revenue	
losses	 stemming	 from	 overly-generous	 incentives.	 	 The	 theory	
states	that	foreign	investment	generates	employment,	integration	
27 Paid Advertisement: “Botswana, Africa’s Gem,” Foreign Affairs, September/ 
     October, 200. Vol. 8, No. , p.
28 Unpublished research by Sony Kapoor.
into	the	local	economy	and	transfer	of	know-how.	In	practice,	the	
reality,	particularly	for	the	poorer	countries,	can	be	much	different.	
In	 short,	 the	 benefits	 of	 FDI	 are	 not	 self-evident,	 as	 claimed	 by	
neoliberal	development	and	anti-corruption	thinking.		
By	 the	 same	 token,	 the	 lowering	 of	 import	 tariffs	 and	 trade	
and	 investment	 liberalisation—as	 demanded	 by	 “free”	 trade	
agreements,	the	WTO,	the	IFIs	and	“aid”	conditionalities—can	have	
a	negative	effect	on	governmental	revenues	and	hence	on	social	
policy	 expenditures,	 making	 countries	 even	 more	 dependent	
on	 lending	and	assistance.	 	That	 the	rich	countries	can	maintain	
subsidies	 and	 protective	 policies	 while	 the	 poorer	 countries	
cannot	speaks	volumes	about	trade	unfairness	and	international	
power	relations.	 	Yet	the	weaker	countries	are	the	ones	targeted	
by	 anti-corruption	 campaigns,	 led	 often	 by	 the	 same	 bodies	




corporations.	 As	 TNCs	 increasingly	 dominate	 world	 trade,	 they	
have	 gone	 beyond	 evading	 regulations	 and	 into	 crafting	 them	
to	their	purposes	and	profit,	at	the	cost	of	billions	to	countries	in	
tax	 revenues.	 	This	 affects	 rich	 and	poor	governments	 alike,	but	
impacts	the	weaker	ones	disproportionately	as	state	prerogatives	
are	 steadily	 negotiated	 away	 through	 bilateral	 but	 also	 global	
legal	 frameworks.	 	A	 series	of	 trade	negotiations	under	 the	old	
General	Agreement	on	Tariffs	and	Trade	and	subsequently	under	
the	World	Trade	Organisation	in	1995	entailed	huge	concessions	
and	 losses	 for	many	 if	 not	most	 of	 the	“developing”	 countries.	
Legally	 enforceable	 agreements	 now	 bind	 the	WTO	 members	
to	 ever-deeper	 liberalisation	 of	 investments	 and	 trade	 in	 both	
merchandise	 and	 services.	 	 Predictably,	 the	WTO	 is	 gripped	 by	
the	 governments	 that	 control	 the	 decision-making	 processes	
in	 the	 IMF	 and	 the	World	 Bank—governments	 of	 countries	 in	
which	 transnational	 corporations	 engaging	 in	 a	 wide	 range	
of	 economic	 sectors	 are	 based	 and	wield	 enormous	 influence.	
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Small	 wonder	 that	 the	 pro-corporate	 anti-corruption	 bodies	
are	 reluctant	 to	speak	about	structural	corruption,	 i.e.	 the	abuse	
of	 corporate	power	 for	private	gain	 at	 the	expense	of	 the	poor,	
North	and	South	alike.	 	Northern	TNCs	and	financial	 institutions,	
abetted	by	accounting	and	legal	firms,	have	all	been	complicit	in	





backhanders.”	 	 British	 delegates	 to	 the	 inaugural	 conference	 of	
the	 UN	 Convention	 against	 Corruption	 in	 Jordan	 in	 December	
2006	“were	 piously	 denouncing	 sleaze	 and	 promising	 to	 tackle	
corruption	‘wherever	we	find	 it—whether	here	or	abroad….’	 	At	
home,	meanwhile,	 their	 colleagues	were	busily	quashing	a	 two-
year	 investigation	 into	allegations	of	bribery	 in	connection	with	
the	country’s	biggest-ever	defence	contract,	the	Al-Yamamah	deal	




While	 the	 British	 government	 ratified	 the	 OECD	 convention	




matter	where	 the	offence	 took	place.	 	Yet	 in	March	of	 2005	 the	








29 “Bribe Britannia,” The Economist, December 19, 2006.  
is	also	one	of	the	top	10	US	military	firms.		Its	director,	Phillip	Caroll,	
is	 a	 former	 chairman	 of	 Shell	 Oil	 and	 was	 tapped	 by	 the	 Bush	
Administration	to	be	the	first	“Senior	Adviser	to	the	Iraqi	Ministry	
of	 Oil”	 in	 2003.	 Allegations	 were	 that	 a	 BAE-administered	 slush	
fund	supplied	the	supposedly	ascetic	royals	with	lush	apartments,	
holidays,	cash,	Jaguars,	Ferraris	and	at	least	one	gold-plated	Rolls	
Royce.	 	All	 in	 return	 for	a	huge	contract	 to	 supply	and	 train	 the	
Saudi	air	force	for	the	paltry	sum	of	$84	billion.	30		
According	 to	 investigative	 reporter	 Chris	 Floyd	 and	 the	 daily	
Observer,	the	Saudi	King	sent	a	message	through	US	Vice	President	
Richard	Cheney—then	in	Riyadh	to	raise	billions	for	Iraq—that	it	
would	 stop	 sharing	 its	 extensive	 intelligence	 on	 terrorism	 and	
kick	out	all	British	military	personnel	if	Prime	Minister	Blair	did	not	
kill	 the	probe.	 	 In	addition,	 the	Saudi	government	 threatened	to	







arms	deals,	war	plans,	 climb-downs,	 big	 lies	 and	Dick	Cheney—
it’s	 a	 scandal	 that	 has	 it	 all,	 corruption	 and	 cowardice	 at	 the	






bribery	 by	 BAE	 Systems	 to	 secure	 a	 huge	 arms	deal	with	 Saudi	
0 Ibid.
 “We appear to be giving businessmen carte blanch to do business with Saudi 
Arabia, which may involve illegal payments or illegal inducements.  We have 
been leaned on very heavily by the Saudis,” sail Eric Illsly, a Labour member of 
Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Select Committee quoted by Chris Lloyd, “Corruption 
and Cover Up: War Profits Trump the Rule of Law,” http://baltimorechronicle.com/
2006/122206Floyd-2.shtml
32 Quoted in “Bribe Britannia,” The Economist, December 19, 2006.  
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Arabia.		The	petioners	argued	that	the	decision	to	discontinue	to	
corruption	 investigation	was	unlawful	because	 it	was	“based	on	
considerations	 of	 potential	 damage	 to	 the	 UK’s	 relations	 with	
Saudi	 Arabia,	 in	 particular,	 damage	 to	 UK/Saudi	 security,	
intelligence	and	diplomatic	cooperation.		This	is	unlawful	because	
it	 contravenes	 Article	 5	 of	 the	 OECD’s	 Anti-Bribery	 Convention,	
which	 prevents	 signatories	 from	 terminating	 an	 investigation	
because	of	“the	potential	effect	[of	an	investigation]	upon	relations	
with	another	State”.		Further,	the	same	decision	was	taken	on	the	
basis	 of	 “tainted”	 advise	 received	 from	 government	 ministers	
government	ministers	 (including	 the	Prime	Minister)	 concerned	
over	“the	 risk	 of	 the	UK	 not	 being	 able	 to	 sell	Typhoon	 aircraft,	
and	other	commercial,	economic	and	diplomatic	matters”.	For	 its	
part,	 the	Blair	government,	having	 failed	 in	 its	effort	 to	stop	 the	



















 Research by  Susan Hawley, Nicholas Hildyard, Sarah Sexton and Larry  
     Lohmann in  http://www.thecornerhouse.org.uk  or Control BAEin http://www. 
     controlbae.org.
4 Patrick Wintour and Ashley Seager, “New bank law to help return of stolen  








change	 in	 business	 as	 usual:	 multiple	 bank	 blacklistings	 could	
become	the	new	trend.35
	
 German group put on graft blacklist, Financial Times, February 2, 2007.
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IV.  Free Trade Imperialism
In	 the	 period	 since	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 World	 Trade	
Organisation	 (WTO)	 in	 1995,	 the	 number	 of	 transnational	
corporations	 operating	 worldwide	 rose	 from	 7,000	 to	 40,000.	
Corporations	 demanded	 and	 required	 an	 international	 trade	
regime	 tailored	 to	 the	 volume	 and	 nature	 of	 its	 operations,	
particularly	 in	 intellectual	 property,	 agricultural	 goods	 and	








in	 agriculture,	 services,	 finance	 and	 industrial	 products	 without	
corresponding	reciprocities.		
There	 is	 something	 corrupt	 about	 an	 international	 exchange	
shaped	 by	 corporations	 through	 the	WTO,	 yet	 that	 same	 body	
being	also	tasked	to	police	the	entire	regime.	 	Perhaps	it	can	be	
no	 other	 way:	 internal	 corporate	 corruption	 is	 complemented,	







for	 governments	 to	 change	 national	 laws	 related	 to	 land	 and	
seeds—in	a	word,	to	facilitate	and	uphold	foreign	corporate	control	
over	 seed	 supply	 and	 agriculture.	 	 Such	monopolistic	 practices,	
aside	from	the	human	toll	and	farmer	suicides	it	entails,	are	also	
corruption.	 	While	 prosecuting	“anti-competitive”	 behaviour,	 the	
WTO	assumes	a	colonialist	task	to	uphold	the	“free	trade”	global	
empire	 and	 punish	 those	 that	 do	 not	 submit.	 	 Governments	
in	 the	 South	 and	 elsewhere	 feel	 compelled	 to	 accept	 the	 free	
trade	credo:	its	rejection	would	spell	immediate	trouble	with	the	
World	 Bank	 and	 the	 IMF	 who,	 along	 with	“donors,”	 demanding	
greater	 “convergence	 and	 coherence”	 at	 the	 level	 of	 national	









to	 uphold	 and	 promote	 the	 neoliberal	 “structural	 reforms/
liberalisation”	 credo.	 	 Those	 governments,	 in	 turn,	 take	 their	
principal	 cue	 from	 the	 giant	 corporate	 conglomerates	 in	 their	
own	 countries	 or	 region.	 	 Trade	 interests	 dictate	 government	
trade	 policy,	 which	 then	 shapes	“cooperation”	 policy	 as	 well	 as	
diplomacy,	 all	 reflecting	 the	 philosophy	 that	 what	 is	 good	 for	
business	 is	 good	 for	 everyone.	 	The	Seattle	 to	Brussels	Network	









treaties’	 fundamental	 objectives	 of	 sustainable	 development,	
environmental	protection,	social	cohesion	and	democracy.”36		
The	 Europe	 Inc.	 strategy—also	 known	 as	 the	 Lisbon	 agenda—
translates	 into	 a	 negotiation	 strategy	 with	 third	 countries	 that	
gives	 priority	 to	 securing	 markets	 for	 European	 goods	 and	
 Myriam Vander Stichele, Kim Biazaarri, Leonard Plank, Corporate Power 
       over EU Trade Policy: Good for Business, Bad for the World, Seattle to Brussels 
      Network, www.s2bnetwork.org
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financial	services,	while	maintaining	the	right	to	dump	subsidised	
agricultural	 surpluses.	 	 Like	 its	 counterparts	 in	 the	 US,	 Canada	
or	 Japan,	 the	 EU	 corporate	 agenda	undermines	 any	 attempt	by	
developing	countries	to	protect	their	markets	from	the	dumping	
of	agricultural	imports.		And	this	in	turn	jeopardises	the	livelihoods	
of	 millions	 of	 small	 farmers	 who	 cannot	 compete	 in	 either	
domestic	 or	 foreign	 markets,	 whilst	 fostering	 environmentally	
unsustainable	 and	 socially	 irresponsible	 agricultural	 practices.	
What	 is	patently	unfair	should	also	be	regarded	as	corruption—
very	much	 in	 consonance	with	 the	widely	 criticised	 absence	 of	
transparency	 and	 excessive	 corporate	 influence	 over	 politicians	
that	 characterises	 not	 only	 EU	 headquarters	 but	 governments	






2002	 then-US	 chief	 trade	 negotiator	 Robert	 Zoelick	 laid	 out	 an	





regionally	 and	bilaterally,	while	 rebuilding	 support	 at	home.	 	By	
moving	forward	on	multiple	fronts,	the	United	States	can	exert	its	
leverage	for	openness,	create	a	new	competition	in	liberalisation,	
target	 the	 needs	 of	 developing	 countries	 and	 create	 a	 fresh	
political	dynamic	by	putting	free	trade	on	the	offensive.”38	
“Free	 trade”	has	become	a	euphemism	 for	 corporate	expansion.	
Even	invaded	war-torn	Iraq	does	not	escape	it.		Recommendation	
62	 of	 the	 US	 bipartisan	 Iraq	 Study	 Group	 report	 calls	 for	 the	
commercialisation	and	privatisation	of	that	country’s	oil	industry.	
7 See the comments by Spanish corporation chiefs at a recent Madrid fair trade  
     in Boletín OMAL (Observatorio de Multinacionales en América Latina), 
     No. , December 200 in www.omal.info 
3 “Unleashing the Trade Winds,” The Economist, December 7-12, 2002.
In	complementary	fashion,	the	report	calls	on	the	IMF	(against	that	
body’s	charter)	to	assist	in	the	removal	of		government	subsidies	
to	 maintain	 low	 domestic	 oil	 prices,	 while	 the	 World	 Bank	 is	




Reflecting	 its	distrust	of	 the	Baghdad	 regime,	but	probably	also	
any	other	South	government,	the	Study	Group	report	insists	that	
“to	combat	corruption,	the	US	government	should	urge	the	Iraqi	
government	 to	post	all	oil	 contracts,	volumes	and	prices	on	 the	





















that	 Saddam’s	 forces	 damaged	 their	 property	 in	 Kuwait—only	
that	they	had	“lost	profits.”		In	the	case	of	American	Express,	they	
39 Iraq Study Group Report in www.uisp.org./isg/iraq_study_  group_report/re 
     port
40 Ibid.
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experienced	a	“decline	 in	business.”41	 	Being	forced	to	pay	these	
reparations,	 the	now	“free	 Iraq”	had	to	take	a	$437m	emergency	
loan	 from	 the	 IMF,	 further	mortgaging	 its	 economy	 to	 external	
creditors.		
“What	 makes	 these	 reparations	 so	 deplorable,”	 said	 the	 Nestlé	









Nestlé	 has	 no	 problems	 declaring	 itself	 the	 rightful	 inheritor	
to	Saddam’s	 treasury,	and	 it	 is	not	 the	first	 time	the	corporation	
has	 tried	 to	 expropriate	 the	 funds	 of	 an	 impoverished	
nation.		 In	 2002,	 the	 company	 tried	 to	 collect	 $6	 million	 from	
Ethiopia—whose	 impending	 famine	 would	 end	 up	 affecting	
11	 million	 people—on	 the	 ludicrous	 basis	 that	 the	 country’s	
long-since	 toppled	 military	 government	 nationalised	 a	
company	 in	 1975	 that	 Nestlé	 would	 later	 come	 to	 own.43	
Examined	 closely,	 the	 Iraq	 reconstruction	 template	 is	 not	
qualitatively	 different	 from	 that	 being	 applied	 to	 post-war	 and	
post-disaster	 scenarios.	 	 What	 Shalmal	 Guttal	 of	 Focus	 on	 the	
Global	 South	 calls	 the	 US	 “vertical	 integration	 model”	 even	
applied	 to	 the	 aftermath	 of	 Hurricane	 Katrina.	 	 Following	 the	
disaster,	a	select	group	of	private	companies	with	long-standing	




41 Naomi Klein, “Why is war-torn Iraq giving $190,000 to Toys R Us?,” 









are	 demanding	 greater	 corporate	 accountability	 in	 its	 dealings	
in	 the	 South.	 	 In	 December	 1999	 Global	 Witness	 published	 a	




elites.	 	 What	 became	 clear	 from	 the	 report	 was	 the	 need	 to	
challenge	corporate	refusal	to	release	financial	information.		
The	 report	 concludes	 with	 a	 public	 call	 on	 the	 oil	 companies	
operating	 in	 Angola	 to	“publish	what	 you	 pay.”	 	 Global	Witness	
has	 been	 joined	by	 the	Christian	 charity	 CAFOD,	 	Open	 Society	
Institute,	Oxfam	GB,	Save	the	Children	UK	and	even	Transparency	
International	 UK	 to	 mount	 a	 worldwide	 campaign	 calling	 for	











Transparency	 International	 (TI)	 came	 under	 fire	 by	 Norwegian	
jurists	and	NGOs	 for	not	 including	 tax	havens	 in	 its	 survey.	 	The	
	
44 Mike Davis,” The Predators of New Orleans,” Le Monde Diplomatique,  
     (October 200), quoted by Shalmali Guttal, “Reconstruction’s Triple Whammy: 
     Wolfowitz, the White House and the World Bank,” Focus on the Global South,  
      December, 200.  www.focusweb.org
4 http://www.publishwhatyoupay.org/english/background.shtml

FIGHTING CORRUPTION: A NON-CORPORATE PERSPECTIVE

FIGHTING CORRUPTION: A NON-CORPORATE PERSPECTIVE
Norwegian	 Tax	 Justice	 Network	 (TJN)	 called	 on	 Transparency	
International	to	rate	tax	havens	as	high	as,	if	not	higher	than	bribery	
in	 terms	 of	 impact	 because	 developing	 countries	 lose	 more	 in	
revenue	this	way	than	from	bribery.	 	TJN	director	John	Christens	
claimed	 that	Transparency	 International’s	Corruption	Perception	
Index	 (CPI)	 distorts	 the	 published	 perception	 on	 corruption	
because	 it	only	 looks	at	one	side	of	 the	equation.	 	 For	example,	
said	Christensen,	the	CPI	“consistently	identifies	Africa	as	a	nexus	











Citigroup,	 the	 US-based	 financial	 conglomerate,	 is	 the	 largest	
financial	 services	 conglomerate	 in	 the	world,	operating	 in	 some	
100	 countries	 with	 1	 trillion	 in	 assets,	 reporting	 120	 billion	 in	
revenues	and	nearly	25	billion	in	net	income	in	2005.		It	describes	
itself	as	“private	bankers”	who	“act	as	financial	architects,	designing	
and	 coordinating	 insightful	 solutions	 for	 individual	 client	








the	 country’s	 foreign	 debt—to	 secret	 offshore	 havens	 over	 the	
course	of	a	decade,	according	to	the	Investigative	Commission	on	
4 ”Transparency International should highlight tax havens,”  (original report 
appeared in the Norwegian Journal Development Today), Odious Debts Online, 







Offshore	 tax	 haven	 systems	 are	 fundamental	 to	 conducting	





and	 military	 officials	 as	 well	 as	 the	 widow	 of	 Colombian	 drug	
trafficker	 Pablo	 Escobar.	 	 Citibank	 officials	 acknowledged	 that	
they	use	the	offshore	system	to	help	clients	avoid	taxes.		Komisar	
explains	that	“the	use	of	‘avoid’	rather	than	‘evade’	is	a	legal	nicety	






also	 responsible	 for	 that	 fact	 and	 officials	 may	 be	 taking	 their	
“cut,”	 but	 the	 cut	 becomes	 legalised	 and	 institutionalised	 as	
countries	compete	to	offer	“incentives”	in	order	to	keep	and	secure	
investment.				
Corporations	 and	 governments	 also	 need	 to	 publish	what	 they	
earn	as	the	product	of	reduced	tax	rates,	tax	holidays	and	in	general	
the	 induction	of	policies	 such	as	financial	 liberalisation	 that	put	
foreign	investors’	 interest	over	domestic	development	goals	and	
encourage	capital	flight	 through	both	 legal	and	 illegal	channels	
47 Lucy Komisar, “Citigroup: a culture and history of tax evasion,” The Public 
Eye on Davos, Tax Justice Network; http://www.taxjustice-usa.org; “Hank and 
Citibank—A Case in Point,” The Nation, www.thenation.com/doc/20008/
komisar; “Confessions of a banker,” New Internationalist, August 200, http://
thekomisarscoop.com
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in	the	banking	system.		While	very	important,	concentrating	on	the	
extractive	industries	is	not	enough;	the	pattern	is	much	the	same	
in	 other	 industries,	 services	 and	 banking.	 	 Researchers	 estimate	









the	 tendency	 is	 to	 shift	 to	higher	 tax	models	 and	 convert	 firms	
to	 joint	 ventures.	 	 Related	 processes	 include	 so-called	 “public-
private	partnerships”	(PPP)	and	“contracting-out”	or	“outsourcing”	
services.	 	 The	 bottom	 line	 is	 that	 corporate	 capital	 from	 richer	
countries	must	expand	and	advance,	no	matter	what	the	costs	or	
modalities,	preferably	by	 insuring	 the	cooperation	of	 corporate-
friendly	governance	subject	more	 to	 international	 legal	 regimes	
than	to	national	ones.			
The	 WTO	 and	 many	 FTAs	 make	 reference	 to	 “trade-related	
infrastructure”;	 this	 can	 include	 the	 privatisation	 of	 energy	 and	
water	services,	highways,	ports	and	airports	and	what	many	refer	
to	the	“Walmartisation”	of	retail.		Linking	“aid”	to	trade,	the	IFIs	can	
use	 their	 economic	 power	 to	 demand	 trade	 liberalisation	 and	
privatisation	in	what	is	termed	“conditionality.”		It	all	forms	part	of	
the	neoliberal	‘development’	model	 that	 covers	up	and	 rewards	
essentially	 unfair	 and	 corrupt	 transactions	 intended	 to	 insure	
domination.
As	Rosa	 Luxemburg	 argued,	 colonialism	 is	 a	 constant	necessary	
condition	 for	 capitalist	 growth.	 	 Colonies	 and	 colonisation	 are	










trade,	particularly	 in	 agriculture,	 is	 dishonest	 and	has	become	a	
virtual	war	against	farmers,	 leading	to	what	she	terms	genocide,	
symbolised	 by	 the	 hundreds	 of	 suicides	 by	 farmers	 driven	 to	
bankruptcy	in	 India	due	to	seed	monopolising	practices	such	as	
Monsanto’s.
Shiva	 writes:	 “The	 partnership	 between	 corporations	 and	
governments	is	leading	to	the	emergence	of	a	corporate	state—






state.	 Fascist	 dictatorship	 is	 an	 inevitable	 outcome	 of	 market	
dictatorship….		Every	village	is	being	made	a	concentration	camp.	
Every	home	is	being	turned	into	a	torture	chamber.”49
49 Vandana Shiva, “Corporate Rule=Fascism,” Znet commentaries, August 6,  
     2006, http://www.zmag.org/sustainers/content/2006-0/0shiva.cfm
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V.  Social Bribery: the Privatisation of Public 
Property and Policy 
As	 we	 have	 argued,	 reducing	 anti-corruption	 engagement	 	 to	
issues	 of	 individual	 bribe-making	 or	 bribe-taking	 does	 not	
advance	 us	 very	 far	 in	 our	 understanding	 of	 corruption	 and	
how	best	 to	 tackle	 the	phenomenon.	 	One	misses	 the	 forest	by	
focusing	on	the	tree.		There	may	less	a	role	for	individual	bribery	
when	 influence	 and	 power	 wielded	 by	 a	 corporate	 entity	 can	
clearly	attain	much	more	and	 in	a	 legalised	manner,	particularly	
where	the	“public”	sector	is	now	engaged	in	soliciting	investment.	
Governments,	 particularly	but	not	 exclusively	 in	 the	 South,	 take	





private	 partnerships),	 tax	 exemptions	 and	 holidays,	 exemption	
from	 import	 duties,	 provision	 of	 communications	 infrastructure,	











capitalists.”	 	 Arguing	 that	massive	 investments	 are	 needed	 and	
that	 the	 state	 cannot	 compete,	 neoliberal	 officials	 come	 to	 the	
unwarranted	 conclusion	 that	 the	 private	 sector	 must	 account	
for	 the	 bulk	 of	 the	 investment	 and	 therefore	 investors	must	 be	
50 Prabat Patnaik, “An Aspect of Neo-Liberalism,” Ideas (December, 2006), No.  
    8. http://www.networkideas.org/news/dec200/news8_Neo_Liberalism.htm
enticed	in	various	ways	through	social	“bribes.”51		The	argument	is	
more	ideological	than	empirical—it	is	also	circular	insofar	as	the	
auctioning	off	of	 the	public	 sector	enterprises	also	deprives	 the	
state	of	t	income	to	effectively	concentrate	the	capital	required	for	
modernisation.
Yet	 corporate-dominated	 entities	 such	 as	 Transparency	















gain,”	 implying	 that	 corruption	 involves	more	 than	public	office	
abuse	 because	 it	 “may	 be	 undertaken	 not	 only	 for	 immediate	
personal	gain	but	also	for	any	‘private	gain,’	including	that	of	family	




USAID	 intentionally	 broadens	 the	 definition	 to	 encompass	
political	and	development	objectives,	given	that	corruption	would	
undermine	both	development	 and	democracy,	 and	 increasingly	
security.	 	 Its	 strategy	 document	 admits	 that	 the	 anti-corruption	
focus	is	chiefly	a	public	sector	one,	but	it	does	recognise	and	extend	
 Ibid.
52 World Bank, Helping Countries Combat Corruption, (World Bank, 1997).
 USAID Anticorruption Strategy, (Washington, D.C., January 200), p. 8.  
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to	 the	field	of	public	and	private	sector	 interaction.	 	For	 its	part,	
the	WB	 identifies	 corruption	 as	“the	 single	 greatest	 obstacle	 to	
economic	 and	 social	 development.”	 	 Corruption	 undermines	
development	 by	“distorting	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	weakening	 the	













Here	 we	 suggest	 shifting	 attention	 towards	 the	 international	









etc—that	 will	 protect	 their	 investment	 against	 the	 state	 itself.	
Where	 the	 state	 behaves	 appropriately—“good	 governance”—




of	 major	 international	 conventions	 and	 agreements—UN,	 OAS,	
54 Robert Klitgaard, Controlling Corruption, (University of California Press, 1991).
OECD—the	 benefit/costs	 of	 engaging	 in	 bribery	 is	 diminishing,	
although	by	no	means	is	it	ended.
While	 corruption	flourishes	under	 the	cover	of	privatisation,	 the	
old	 anti-corruption	 school	 wastes	 its	 time	 trying	 to	 measure	
the	 phenomenon.	 	The	 best	 known	 instrument	 is	 the	TI	 annual	
corruption	index,	which	does	not	measure	corruption	per	se	but	
perceptions	of	 it	(which	may	or	may	not	coincide).	 	 If	corruption	
is	a	matter	of	perception,	one	must	ask	whose	perception?	 	The	
Transparency	 Index	 Corruption	 Report	 tends	 to	 gather	 the	




public	services	and	 infrastructure.	 	The	media	 in	many	countries	














Some	have	 taken	 to	blaming	 the	culture	and	continents	 for	 the	
absence	of	progress,	declaring	entire	regions	and	societies	to	be	
 According to its authors, “The 200 Corruption Perceptions Index is a composite 
index that draws on multiple expert opinion surveys that poll perceptions of public 
sector corruption in  countries around the world, the greatest scope of any CPI to 
date. It scores countries on a scale from zero to ten, with zero indicating high levels 
of perceived corruption and ten indicating low levels of perceived corruption.” 
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/cpi_200
0
FIGHTING CORRUPTION: A NON-CORPORATE PERSPECTIVE

FIGHTING CORRUPTION: A NON-CORPORATE PERSPECTIVE
hopelessly	corrupt	and	arguing	that	corruption	is	a	manifestation	
of	some	deep	cultural	disorder	and	character	flaw	that	practices	





While	 the	 debate	 on	 public	 sector	 corruption	 grows	 sterile,	 the	
pace	of	privatisation	 is	accelerating	 in	 the	 real	world.	 	This	 is	no	
coincidence.	 	Corruption	 is	 the	reason	privatisation	 is	 important,	
coming	 as	 a	 heaven-sent	 solution	 that	 would	 also	 allow	 the	
industries	 and	 countries	 to	 be	 “competitive.”	 	 Joseph	 Stiglitz,	
who	while	 at	 the	World	 Bank	 helped	 shape	 the	 anti-corruption	
thrust,	upheld	 the	connection	while	employed	by	 the	Bank,	but	
later	 commented	 somewhat	 apologetically	 that	 “I’m	 not	 sure	
these	 private	 sector	 advocates	 quite	 had	 in	 mind	 the	 abilities	
that	American	corporate	capitalism	has	demonstrated	 so	amply	
recently:	 corruption	on	 an	 almost	unfathomable	 scale.	They	put	
to	 shame	 those	petty	government	bureaucrats	who	 stole	 a	 few	
thousand	 dollars	 or	 even	 a	 few	million.	 	 The	 numbers	 bandied	










in	order	 to	shrink	 the	public	 sector	and	 relegate	 the	state	 to	an	
56 Chabal, Patrick & Chaloz, Pascal, Africa Works - Disorder as political  
     instrument. (Oxford, 1999).
57 Joseph Stiglitz, Corporate Corruption, The conflicts of Interest Driving US  
     Financial Scandals are being Replicated on a Global Scale, Guardian  
     (London), July 4, 2002, available on http://www.commondreams.org/ 




national	 governments	 would	 limit	 themselves	 to	 insuring	 legal	
systems	based	on	private	property	 (as	 opposed	 to	 those	based	
on	communal	 tenure).	 	The	point	 is	 to	offer	 the	most	conducive	
conditions	 to	 corporate	 investment	 and	 a	 furious	 multi-
dimensional	privatisation	process	driven	by	the	needs	of	the	TNCs	
and	the	dynamics	of	global	capitalism,	sweeping	up	water,	energy,	
public	 services,	 health,	 education,	 technology	 and	 intellectual	
property.		If	there	is	a	role	for	the	state	under	this	scheme	of	affairs,	
it	 is	one	of	advancing	private	sector	interests	through	free	trade	
and	 investment	agreements,	all	 in	 the	belief	 that	 it	will	advance	
economic	growth	and	allow	their	own	private	sectors	to	expand	
and	profit.
Unfortunately,	 the	dominant	 corruption	 school	has	no	place	 for	
examining	 the	 links	 among	privatisation,	 the	growth	of	poverty	
and	social	inequality	and	ecological	degradation.		Nothing	is	said	
about	irreparable	damages	caused	by	privatisation/liberalisation	
on	 small-scale	 producers	 and	 retailers	 (“Walmartisation”),	 and	
on	 economically	 and	 socially	 vulnerable	 sectors,	 including	
indigenous	communities	and	women.		In	this	context,	Transparency	
International	joins	the	international	entities	that	are	central	to	the	
privatisation	 drive,	 including	 the	 corporations	 themselves,	 the	
World	Bank	and	the	Asian	and	Inter-American	Development	banks.	
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VI  Governance and Corruption












In	 what	 Harvard	 Professor	 Dani	 Rodrik	 calls	 the	 Augmented	
Washington	Consensus,	the	World	Bank	and	the	big	corporations	






























Taking	 “structural	 adjustment”	 into	 its	 third	 decade	 in	 areas	
such	as	Latin	America,	the	IFIs	and	the	“donors”	pushed	for	more	
private	 sector-friendly	“reforms”	 to	make	countries	adjust	 to	 the	
increasing	 requirements	 of	 corporate	 investors—with	 much	 of	
the	 zeal	 wrapped	 up	 in	 the	 discourse	 of	 anti-corruption,	 good	
governance	 and	 institution-building.	 	 Rodrik	 argues,	 “Taken	 to	
its	 logical	 conclusion,	 the	 focus	 on	 institutions	 has	 potentially	
debilitating	 side	 effects	 for	 policy	 reformers.	 Institutions	 are	 by	
their	very	nature	deeply	embedded	in	society.	 	 If	growth	indeed	
requires	major	 institutional	 transformation—in	 the	areas	of	 rule	
of	 law,	 property	 rights	 protection,	 governance	 and	 so	on—how	





To	 its	 credit,	 the	 mainstream	 anti-corruption	 discussions	 have	
accepted	that	anti-corruption	(state)	practices	are	best	addressed	
within	 the	 framework	 of	 governance—“good	 governance”	 as	
the	 “donors”	 term	 it.	 	 But	 good	 for	 whom?	 	 Like	 “reform”	 and	
“transparency”	 or	“accountability,”	 the	words	 are	 bandied	 about	
as	 something	 not	 only	 inherently	 desirable	 but	 also	 intrinsic	 to	
the	content	of	mainstream	reform:	liberalisation	and	privatisation.	
Corruption	fighters	are	supposed	to	make	this	huge	leap.
Leading	 the	new	western	crusade	 is	none	other	 than	 the	World	
Bank,	today	bent	on	becoming	the	global	anti-corruption	standard	
bearer,	 probably	 because	 if	 it	 does	 not	 stand	 as	 judge	 it	would	





misused.	 	 The	 World	 Bank	 rejected	 this	 figure	 and	 vigorously	
defended	its	anti-corruption	efforts.59
8 Dani Rodrik, “Good Bye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington
     Confusion?,” http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~drodrik/Lessons of the 1990s  
     review _JEL_.pdf
59 Bretton Woods Project, US lawmakers scrutinise World Bank record on 
     corruption, 28th May 2004, <http://brettonwoodsproject.org/art. 
     shtml?x=22>
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What	 the	 senators	 did	 not	 look	 into	was	 the	 evidence	 that	 IFI-	
and	 “donor”-supported	 privatisation	 and	 liberalisation	 was	
itself	 generating	 corruption.	 	 Data	 are	 mounting	 steadily	 that	
liberalisation	 can	 actually	 magnify	 existing	 corruption	 and	





the	Bank	has	 tried	 to	establish	empirical	 linkages	between	anti-
corruption	(governance)	reforms	and	economic	growth,	but	even	
internal	 Bank	 evaluations	 describe	 the	 link	 between	 corruption	
and	country	performance	as	“more	varied	and	diverse.”
Nonetheless,	 the	 introduction	 of	 governance	 into	 the	 debate	
obliges	us	to	look	at	corruption	in	the	context	of	power	within	and	
outside	 government	 and	 at	 national	 economic	 policy	 decision-













wage	 caps	 on	 public	 employees,	 including	 teachers	 and	 police,	
which	in	turn	generate	unwarranted	solicitations.		
But	the	opposite	 is	also	true.	 	A	study	on	Uganda	 indicated	that	
the	 large	amounts	of	financial	assistance	provided	by	donors	 to	
implement	 structural	 adjustment	 and	 governance	 reforms	 also	
allowed	the	regime	to	increase	its	patronage	practices.		Uganda’s	
creditors	proved	 reluctant	 to	press	 the	government	 to	 confront	
corruption	precisely	because	all	other	conditionalities	 related	to	
liberalisation	 and	 privatisation	 were	 being	 successfully	 carried	
out.		The	study	concluded	that	“by	giving	large	amounts	of	aid	to	





Much	 the	 same	 “good	 governance”	 logic	 drives	 contemporary	
“free	 trade”	 agreements	 and	 the	 workings	 of	 the	 World	 Trade	
Organisation	 norms.	 	 The	 fundamental	 issue	 is	 insuring	 that	
governmental	 institutions	 adopt	 and	 protect	 open	 markets,	
liberalisation	 and	 “non-discriminatory”	 treatment	 for	 the	
transnational	corporate	entities	and	foreign	direct	investment	in	
general.		For	all	the	talk	of	governance	and	anti-corruption	actions,	




In	 its	 version	 of	 good	 governance,	 the	 International	 Financial	
Institutions	 employ	 their	 power—i.e.,	 conditionality—to	 push	
corporate-friendly	 “institution-building”	 and	 policy	 “advice”	 on	
banking	 law,	 contract	 law	 and	 company	 law,	 and	 on	 the	 role	
of	 the	 judiciary	 and	 arbitration	 mechanisms	 modelled	 on	 US	
jurisprudence.	 	 The	“reforms”	 get	“institutionalised”	 or	 locked	 in	
through	national	laws	and	the	threat	of	sanctions.		Departure	from	
the	governance	norms	can	deprive	the	offending	government	of	
the	 IMF	seal	of	approval,	which	 for	“donors”	 is	a	precondition	 to	
further	 lending.	 	 In	 similar	 fashion,	 according	 to	one	 study,	“The	
World	 Bank’s	 understanding	 of	 good	 governance	 continues	 to	
reflect	a	concern	over	the	effectiveness	of	the	state	rather	than	the	
equity	of	the	economic	system	and	the	 legitimacy	of	the	power	
0 Tangri, Roger & Andrew M. Mwenda (200): “Politics, donors and the 
ineffectiveness of anti-corruption institutions in Uganda” The Journal of Modern 
African Studies, vol. 44, pp.101-124; Mwenda, Andrew M. & Roger Tangri (2005): 
“Patronage politics, donor reforms and regime consolidation in Uganda,” African 
Affairs, 104/416, pp. 449-467.
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structure.”61	To	which	another	analysis	adds,	“Much	of	the	content	








systems,’	 of	 ‘limiting	 ad	 hoc	 decision-making	 and	 preferential	











productive	 and	 justified.	 	 Graham	 Harrison	 at	 the	 University	 of	
Sheffield	 examined	 the	 role	 of	 the	World	 Bank	 in	 constructing	
“governance	states”	 in	Africa.	Harrison	argued	that	 the	“intimacy	
of	the	Bank’s	intervention	allows	it	to	represent	its	actions	not	as	
external	 intervention	 but	 as	 a	‘partner’	within	 sovereign	 states.”	
“The	 fragility	 of	 governance	 states	 and	 the	 largesse	 of	 external	
agencies	produce	the	‘grease’	that	allows	African	elites	to	embrace	
 Santiso, C., ‘Governance Conditionality and the Reform of Multilateral 
Development Finance,’ G8 Governance no.7, at http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/g7/
governance/santiso2002-gov7.pdf. 
2 Bretton Woods Project, Good Governance and the World Bank, www.
brettonwoodsproject.org., p.2.
 Remy Herrera, “Good Governance v. Good Government” in International 
Initiative on Corruption and Governance, Governance and Corruption, Towards a 







and	 even	 racist	 element	 involved	 as,	 in	 their	 non-diplomatic	
moments,	Northern	government	and	corporate	officials	hold	that	
governments	 and	 societies	 in	 the	 South,	 particularly	 Africa,	 are	
“inherently”	and	almost	irreparably	corrupt	and	that	governments	





themselves,	without	 the	pro-corporate	 tutelage	of	many	 foreign	
agencies.	 	 Financial	 dependence	 on	 aid,	 loans	 and	 investments,	
however,	 insure	 governmental	 compliance	 with	 the	 dozens	 of	
conditions	 attached	 to	 IFIs’	 seal	 of	 approval	 and	disbursements.	
There	is	nothing	wrong	with	instituting	environmental	and	social	















4 Bretton Woods Project,  Bank constructs ‘Governance States’, July 27, 2004,  
<http://brettonwoodsproject.org/art.shtml?x=6293>
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and/or	misuse	of	political	 authority	and	 influence.	 	Citizens	 feel,	
or	should	feel,	cheated—that	their	resources	(taxes,	environment)	
are	 being	 siphoned	 off	 for	 private	 benefit.	 	 In	 the	 media	 and	
electoral	 scuffles,	 less	 attention	 is	 paid	 to	 institutionalised	 and	
global	components	of	corruption.





will	 mount	 campaigns	 of	 a	 personal	 nature,	 believing	 that	
looking	at	broader	external	aspects	will	undercut	the	opportunist	
immediate	 objective.	 	 Worse	 still,	 the	 real	 corrupt	 entities	 will	
remain	unscathed—in	 fact,	 they	 too	help	 shape	definitions	 and	
export	ways	of	“safely”	fighting	globalise	corruption	and	 indeed	
the	corrupt	dynamics	of	the	prevailing	international	order.
Of	 late	 one	 detects	 increasing	 acknowledgements	 as	 regards	
the	 conventional	 definition	 and	 analysis	 of	 corruption.	 	 Daniel	
Kaufman,	 head	 of	 the	World	 Bank	 Institute	 (WBI,	 which	 is	 part	
of	 the	 WB	 Group),	 admits	 that	 “this	 analysis	 has	 been	 mainly	
founded	 on	 bureaucratic/public	 sector	 corruption,	 emphasising	
particular	 manifestations	 such	 as	 administrative	 bribery…	 for	
private	gain.”65	 	Reflecting	experiences	of	post-Cold	War	Eastern	
Europe	 and	 elsewhere,	 the	 Bank	 and	 recent	 Anti-Corruption	


















monitoring,	 evaluation	 and	 enforcement.	 	“This	makes	 the	 anti-
corruption	 task	 much	 more	 difficult,”	 he	 admits,	 because	 “we	





that	 a)	 corruption	may	 arise	 through	 other	 less	 obvious	 forms,	











office.	 	The	 focus	 is	 still	 on	 the	public	 sector	 and	 the	 traditional	









7 Robert Klitgaard, “Leadership beyond Systemic Corruption,” (December 
2004), Claremont Graduate University, http://www.cgu.edu/include/Leadership_
Under_System_Corruption_12-04.pdf
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public	servant	lies	a	conception	of	the	state	as	a	parasite	that	only	
extracts	resources	for	the	sake	of	a	few	bureaucrats	and	politicians.	




One	 of	 the	 many	 problems	 of	 the	 neoliberal	 anti-corruption	
ideology	 is	 how	 it	 influences	 discussions	 not	 only	 on	 how	 to	
measure	 corruption	 but	where	 to	 look	 for	 it,	 setting	 a	 basis	 for	
the	 further	weakening	of	 the	 state	 in	 the	 face	 of	 domestic	 and	




authority	 is	 required	 and	 can	 be	 effectively	 exercised.	 	 You	 do	
away	with	bribery	by	getting	rid	of	potential	bribe-takers,	who	are	
guilty	before	proven	innocent.68		Again,	if	the	diagnosis	is	partial	





8 Joel Hellman y Daniel Kaufmann, “La captura del Estado en las economías 
     de transición,” www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance
VII. Global Corporations and
        Global Governance
Joseph	Stiglitz	figures	among	the	many	who	now	will	admit	that	
the	international	market	forces	have	simply	become	too	powerful	










unprecedented	amounts	of	economic	power.	 	And	 it	 is	 societies	
and	sometimes	governments,	particularly	but	not	exclusively	in	the	
South,	that	become	the	victims	of	economic	liberalisation	policies,	
particularly	 privatisations,	 which	 account	 for	 massive	 amounts	
of	 resources	transferred	to	private,	 largely	unaccountable	hands.	











will	 insure	 “effectiveness.”	 	 Daniel	 Kaufman,	 director	 of	 global	
programmes	at	 the	World	Bank	 Institute	 in	Washington,	calls	 for	
new,	more	forceful	levels	of	Bank	and	other	external	involvement	
in	developing	country	policy-making.		
69 “Foreign Direct Investment - High Risk, Low Reward for Development,” http://
www.blue21.de/PDF/FDI-Report_High_Risk_Low_Reward.pdf
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According	 to	 Kaufman,	 there	 is	 a	 need	 to	 go	beyond	 the	 initial	
development	agency	 insistence	on	anti-corruption	commissions	
and	 campaigns:	 “second	 generation	 institutional	 reforms”	 are	
required	 to	 support	 accountability	 and	 transparency.	 	 “One	
does	 not	 fight	 corruption	 by	 fighting	 corruption,”	 he	 told	 the	
International	Herald	Tribune;	“one	has	to	instead	go	to	the	tougher,	
more	 systemic	 weaknesses	 and	 implement	 the	 appropriate	




It	 is	 not	 incorrect	 to	 make	 an	 analytical	 linkage	 between	
corruption	and	governance	and	from	governance	to	development	
and	 “development	 assistance.”	 	 This,	 however,	 begs	 the	 critical	
question	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 development	model.	 	 Led	 by	 the	
World	Bank,	development	agencies	evade	the	issue	of	protecting	
corporations	 and	 instead	 attribute	 development	 shortcomings	
to	 inadequate	governance	and	high	corruption	 levels,	a	“cancer”	
on	the	global	economy	and	a	measurable	impediment	to	poverty	
reduction,	 according	 to	 the	World	 Bank	 and	others.	 	 Corruption	
is	 one	manifestation	 of	 the	 failures	 in	 the	 dominant	 neoliberal	
model	(which	is	not	to	imply	that	other	development	models	do	
not	or	might	not	have	corruption	problems);	 the	 trouble	 is	 that	
the	 model’s	 shortcomings	 are	 blamed	 on	 corruption	 and	 bad	
governance,	not	on	the	model	itself.			
Over	the	course	of	the	late	nineties,	that	logic	came	to	be	expressed	
in	 the	 increasing	 number	 of	 conditions	 agencies	 placed	 on	 aid	
recipients	 attempting	 to	 “fix”	 governance	 and	 stop	 corruption.	
According	to	one	observer,	“Governance	experts	at	the	Bank	and	




70 “Anticorruption drive: Bark or bite?,” International Herald Tribune, April ,  




corruption	do	not	do	so	because	 they	 favour	corruption.	 	Some	
critics	 worry	 about	 corruption	 in	 the	 corruption	 agenda	 itself:	
that	the	fight	will	be	used	as	a	‘cover’	for	cutting	aid	to	countries	
that	displease	the	US	administration.		Such	concerns	have	found	
resonance	 in	 the	 seeming	 incongruity	 of	 the	 Bank’s	 tough	 talk	
on	 corruption	 and	 simultaneous	 plans	 to	 expand	 lending	 to	
Iraq.	 	 No	 one	 is	 likely	 to	 certify	 that	 Iraq	 is	 corruption-free—or	




But	 profit	 is	 more	 important	 than	 policies	 and	 procedures.	 	 In	










in	 private	 sector	 actors	 to	 implement	 these	 rules/policies	while	
heaping	costs	 (including	debt	 repayment)	on	the	occupied,	and	
when	 things	 go	 wrong—as	 they	 inevitably	 would	 under	 such	
circumstances—the	 Bank	 will	 declare	 the	 affected	 country	 to	
72 Joseph Stiglitz, “Corrupting the Fight against Corruption” (November, 200).
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/stiglitz7
7 To which one blogger acidly commented: “And of course, the nomination of Paul 
Wolfowitz at the World Bank was the perfect example of such good procedures we 
want to develop in those countries.  He is surely the most competent guy around 
in development and institution building issues.  As a key architect of the war in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, he showed how invading countries is a much more efficient 
technique for imposing democracy, good institutions, security and development 
than are traditional long-term strategies of the World Bank.” http://economistsview.
typepad.com/economistsview/200//links_stiglitz_.html
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What	 Naomi	 Klein	 terms	 “disaster	 capitalism”	 is	 riddled	 with	
state-protected	corruption:	“The	first	 step	was	 the	government’s	
abdication	of	its	core	responsibility	to	protect	the	population	from	
disasters.	 Under	 the	 Bush	 administration,	 whole	 sectors	 of	 the	
government,	most	notably	the	Department	of	Homeland	Security,	
have	 been	 turned	 into	 glorified	 temp	 agencies,	 with	 essential	
functions	contracted	out	to	private	companies.	The	theory	is	that	
entrepreneurs,	driven	by	the	profit	motive,	are	always	more	efficient	
(please	suspend	hysterical	 laughter)....	 	Where	has	all	 the	money	
gone?,”	 ask	 desperate	 people	 from	 Baghdad	 to	 New	 Orleans,	
from	 Kabul	 to	 tsunami-struck	 Sri	 Lanka.	 One	 place	 a	 great	 deal	
of	it	has	gone	is	into	major	capital	expenditures	for	these	private	
contractors.	 Largely	 under	 the	 public	 radar,	 billions	 of	 taxpayer	
dollars	 have	 been	 spent	 on	 the	 construction	 of	 a	 privatised	
disaster-response	 infrastructure…	 built	 almost	 exclusively	 with	
money	 from	 public	 contracts,	 including	 the	 training	 of	 its	 staff	
(overwhelmingly	 former	 civil	 servants,	 politicians	 and	 soldiers).	
Yet	it	is	all	privately	owned;	taxpayers	have	absolutely	no	control	





reach	 dizzying	 heights.	 	 The	 US	 can	 set	 up	 the	 government—
engineering	a	 coup,	 evicting	an	elected	President	 as	 in	Haiti,	 or	
simply	invading	a	country—and	the	World	Bank,	led	by	war	planner	
Paul	Wolfowitz,	places	laws	into	effect	that	favour	US	commercial	
and	 political	 interests,	 while	 handing	 out	 choice	 contracts	 for	
“rebuilding”	 and	“rehabilitation.”	 	 According	 to	Guttal,	“everyone	
74 Shalmali Guttal, “Reconstruction’s Triple Whammy: Wolfowitz, the White  
     House and the World Bank,” Focus on the Global South, December, 200.   
     www.focusweb.org
75 Naomi Klein, “Pay to be Saved,” The Nation, (August 29, 2006), 




The	 blueprints	 are	 comprehensive,	 multidimensional	 and	 pre-
planned.	 	Military	components	are	not	excluded.	 	This	was	most	
evident	 in	 the	 case	 of	 Haiti,	 when	 the	 Clinton	 Administration	
decided	 to	 re-install	 the	 deposed	 President	 Aristide	 in	 power.	
Or	at	 least	a	mediated	power.	 	As	Aristide	was	 to	 recall	after	his	
second	ousting	 in	2004,	Washington	 insisted	 that	Aristide	agree	
to	pay	 the	debts	 accumulated	under	 the	Duvalier	 dictatorships,	











In	 the	months	 that	 followed,	Washington	 cut	 off	 loans	 and	 aid,	
severely	 undermining	 the	 government,	 while	 USAID	 provided	
millions	to	opposition	groups.		In	February	2004,	US	officials	placed	
Aristide	 on	 an	 aircraft	 and	 transported	 him	 forcibly	 into	 exile.	
Klein	 asked	what	 had	 changed	 since	 the	 overthrow	 of	 Aristide:	
“Corruption?		Violence?		Fraud?		Aristide	is	certainly	no	saint.		But	
even	 if	 the	 worst	 of	 the	 allegations	 are	 true,	 they	 pale	 next	 to	
the	rap	sheets	of	the	convicted	killers,	drug	smugglers	and	arms	
traders	who	ousted	Aristide	and	continue	to	enjoy	free	rein,	with	
full	 support	 from	 the	Bush	Administration	and	 the	UN.	 	Turning	
Haiti	 over	 to	 this	 underworld	gang	out	of	 concern	 for	Aristide’s	
lack	 of	‘good	 governance’	 is	 like	 escaping	 an	 annoying	 date	 by	
accepting	a	lift	home	from	Charles	Manson.”77		Since	then,	and	in	
7 Ibid.
77 Naomi Klein, “Aristide in Exile,” The Nation, (August , 200), 
     http://www.thenation.com/doc/200080/klein
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the	 wake	 of	 continued	 support	 for	 Aristide	 inside	 his	 country,	
US-funded	 groups	 are	 ardently	 at	 work	 hurling	 accusations	 of	
corruption	against	the	exiled	President.78









Unfortunately,	 the	 so-called	 War	 on	 Terror	 is	 being	 taken	 as	
justification	 for	 a	 more	 multi-faceted	 intervention	 against	
patterns	of	“grand”	corruption	that	supposedly	entails	risks	to	the	
rich	countries’	national	security.			According	to	USAID,	corruption	
undermines	 government	 effectiveness	 and	 legitimacy,	 thereby	










donors,	 rather	 than	multilateral	 banks,	may	need	 to	 lead	 in	 this	
area	 given	 the	 highly	 political	 nature	 of	 grand	 corruption,	 and	
thus	the	necessity	for	anticorruption	efforts	to	reach	well	beyond	
the	executive	branch	of	government.”		A	specific	recommendation	
reads:	“Harness	 external	 sources	 of	 pressure	 for	 reform	 through	
78 See the website of the “Haiti Democracy Project”
     http://www.haitipolicy.org/articles/corruption/government/
79 Op. Cit. USAID Anticorruption Strategy, p. .  
strategies	 such	 as	 donor	 consultative	 groups	 and	 interagency	
efforts.	 	 Coordinated	 diplomatic	 efforts	 can	 serve	 as	 the	 ‘stick’	
while	donor	agreements	act	as	a	‘carrot.”80
What	 is	 clear	 is	 that	 anticorruption	 and	 governance	 promotion	






are	 pushing	 the	 same	governance-corruption	 conjunction	 if	 for	
no	other	reason	that	it	also	conveniently	justifies	greater	agency	
micro-vigilance	 of	 projects,	 policies	 and	 local	 institutions,	 all	
couched	 in	 the	 rubric	of	aid	effectiveness.	 	Setting	aside	 for	 the	
moment	the	reluctance	of	“donors”	to	review	their	own	loop	hole-
filled	procedures,	 	 one	 first	 needs	 to	 ask	 if	 aid	 flows	 are	 indeed	
necessary	to	achieve	economic	and	social	progress	in	the	South.	




and	 national	 capacities	 to	 present	 alternatives	 to	 development	








other	projects	 started	between	1985	 and	1992	 in	Nigeria,	more	
than	half	had	little	impact	or	were	unsustainable,	according	to	the	
World	Bank.”81	
0 Ibid. p. 1, 19.
8 “Africa Tackles Graft, with Billions in Aid in Play,” The New York Times, 
     July , 200.
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In	 July,	 2002	 the	 International	 Rivers	 Network	 reported	 how	




was	because	 the	 contractors	were	one	of	 the	biggest	 clients	 of	
the	International	Finance	Corporation,	the	Bank’s	investment	arm.	
In	 Kenya,	 another	 Bank	 official	 was	 brought	 to	 trial	 after	 being	
sacked	 for	 receiving	 kickbacks	 from	 two	 Swedish	 companies	
in	 exchange	 for	 steering	 certain	 bank	 contracts	 to	 those	 firms.	
Observers	argued	that	the	World	Bank	and	other	donors	“see	what	




By	 the	 same	 token,	 rich	 country	 governments	 have	 official	 or	
quasi-official	export	credit	agencies	tasked	with	providing	private	
firms	 with	 “export	 credit	 guarantees”	 (subsidies)	 that	 are	 then	
charged	 to	 the	 recipient	 country,	 with	 little	 regard	 to	 evidence	
of	corrupt	behaviour	on	the	firm’s	part.	 	Such	“insurance”	against	
non-performance	 by	 the	 developing	 country	 counterpart	





According	 to	 Export	 Credit	 Agency	Watch,	 an	 NGO	monitoring	






emitting	 power	 plants,	 large-scale	 dams,	 mining	 projects,	 road	
development	 in	 pristine	 tropical	 forests,	 oil	 pipelines,	 chemical	
and	industrial	facilities,	forestry	and	plantation	schemes,	to	name	
2 “Bank’s pledge to fight corruption put to test,” Bretton Woods Update No. 29,  
      (July, 200) www.brettonwoodsproject.org/topic/governance, 
a	few.	 	Because	most	of	 these	projects	are	high	risk	due	to	their	
environmental,	political,	 social	and	cultural	 impacts,	most	would	
not	 come	 to	 life	 without	 the	 support	 and	 financial	 backing	 of	
ECAs.	Hence,	ECAs	are	strategic	development	 linchpins	that	play	
an	enormous	part	in	the	harmful	impacts	of	corporate	globalisation.”	83		
Even	 Transparency	 International	 has	 felt	 obliged	 to	 blow	 the	
whistle,	 not	 on	 the	 ECAs	 but	 on	 the	 bribery	 that	 takes	 place	 in	
similar	 transactions:	“Bribing	 foreign	 officials	 in	 order	 to	 secure	
overseas	 contracts	 for	 their	 exports	 has	 become	 a	 widespread	
practice	in	industrial	countries,	particularly	in	certain	sectors	such	
as	exports	of	military	equipment	and	public	works.		Normally	these	
contracts	 are	 guaranteed	 by	 government-owned	 or	 -supported	
Export	 Credit	 Insurance	 schemes	 (HERMES	 in	Germany,	 COFACE	
in	 France,	 DUCROIRE	 in	 Belgium,	 ECGD	 in	 the	 UK).”84	 	 No	 small	
amount	of	private	debt	has	become	public	debt	through	this	sorry	
mechanism.		In	fact,	according	to	ECA	Watch,	such	credits	account	
for	 the	 single	 biggest	 component	 of	 developing	 country	 debt,	
consisting	in	1996	some	24%	of	total	debt	and	56%	of	debt	owed	
to	official	agencies.		
Why	 not	 speak	 of	 the	 need	 to	 also	 insure	 corporate	 “good	
governance”	and	corporate	 transparency,	or	of	 the	public’s	 right	
to	secure	information	from	corporate	entities?		There	is	increasing	
acknowledgement	 of	 the	“supply	 dimension,”	 but	 again	 limited	
to	individual	malfeasance.	 	Thus,	at	the	Bank’s	Spring	meeting	in	
May	 2006,	 President	 Wolfowitz	 admitted	 that	 “for	 every	 bribe-
taker,	there’s	a	bribe-giver,	and	often	that	comes	from	a	developed	
country….		We	need	to	do	more	to	address	the	issue	and	to	hold	
private	 corporations	 accountable	 for	 exporting	 corruption	 to	
emerging	economies.”		
According	to	some	observers,	Wolfowitz	was	responding	to	criticism	




8 A number of examples can be consulted on www.eca-watch.org 
4 www.eca-watch.org`
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out	 corruption:	 will	 it	 touch	 the	 roots?,”	 the	 Bretton	 Woods	
Project,	 a	 European	 NGO	monitoring	 and	 advocacy	 group,	 said	













the	 transnationals,	‘governments	 that	 have	not	 followed	 correct	
fiscal,	monetary,	pricing	and	trade	policies,	and	governments	that	
are	not	accountable	to	their	population.’		‘The	market,’	say	the	left	






resources	at	 their	 command	 that	 to	challenge	 them	 is	an	uphill	
struggle.		In	the	battlefield	of	competing	ideas,	the	playing	fields	
are	not	level.”86		
8 Financial Express, May 24, 200 quoted in Odious Debt Online, June , 200, 
www.odiousdebts.org/odiousdebts/publications/WorldBankWeedsOutCorruption.pdf
8 Yash Tandon, “Reclaiming Africa’s Agenda,” in Yash Tandon, ed., African 
Conceptions of Democracy and Good Governance, (International South Group 
Network: Harare, 1996), p. 2.
VIII. Private Global Power for
         Private Northern Gain
There	 is	a	need	to	refocus	the	struggle	against	corruption—and	
by	 implication	 for	 better	 governance—so	 as	 to	 take	 account	 of	
many	 issues	 that	hinder	 institutional	development.	 	The	theft	of	
public	 resources	 obviously	 hinders	 institutional	 strengthening,	
but	 resources	 are	 also	 stolen	 in	 other	 ways	 and	 must	 similarly	
merit	 the	 study	 of	 anti-corruption	 campaigners.	 	 Perhaps	 there	
is	no	greater	 corruption	 that	 that	which	year	after	 year	extracts	





Hundreds	 of	 billions	 of	 dollars,	 far	 in	 excess	 of	 aid	 inflows,	 are	
moved	out	of	poor	countries	and	into	the	rich	ones	yearly,	in	the	
form	 of	 debt	 repayments,	 private	 sector	 transfers	 and	 existing	
commercial	 trade	 and	 financial	 flow	 patterns.	 	 North	 to	 South	
aid,	 loans	and	private	capital	 investment	 feed	 rather	 than	offset	
the	imbalance:	“aid”	arrives	with	strings	attached	that	place	clear	
limits	 on	 national	 policies	 to	 escape	 dependence	 and	mobilise	
national	resources.		Instead,	the	strings	perpetuate	a	corrupt	and	






Small	wonder	 that	many	 in	 the	South	 feel	 that	a	 fairly	 standard	
colonial	demand	for	privileged	access	to	a	country’s	resources	is	
at	the	root	of	much	of	Northern	“anti-corruption”	patronage,	and	
behind	 the	 export	 of	 good	 governance.	 	 Public	 institutions	 are	
asked	simply	to	get	out	of	 the	way	or,	more	recently,	 to	actually	
facilitate	 the	 extraction.	 	 But	 neoliberal	 “aid”	 and	 “investment”	
promotion	 discourse	 would	 have	 us	 believe	 that	 the	 capital	
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flows	from	North	to	South	are	necessary	and	indeed	even	acts	of	
kindness.		
What	 International	 Financial	 Institutions	 and	 bilateral	 “donors”	










There	 is	a	need,	 therefore,	 to	 take	 the	anti-corruption	campaign	
into	the	international	debate	on	aid,	debt	and	capital	flows.87		
Fortunately,	 civil	 society	 groups	 North	 and	 South	 are	 working	
together		to	help	control	corporate	abuses.		The	European	Coalition	
for	 Corporate	 Justice,	 a	 network	 of	 organisations	 across	 Europe,	
pursues	 such	goals	based	on	“a	 vision	of	 a	 sustainable	world	 in	
which	corporations’	drive	for	profit	is	balanced	by	the	interest	of	








entailing	 huge	 profits	 in	 a	 world	 rife	 with	 poverty	 and	 disease.	
One	has	to	look,	conceptually	and	arithmetically,	at	the	far	greater	
“drains”	 on	 public	 resources	 than	 those	 commonly	 signalled	 by	
corporate	 friendly	 anti-corruption	 campaigners,	 including	 the	
World	Bank.
7 “Foreign Direct Investment - High Risk, Low Reward for Development,
     ” http://www.blue21.de/PDF/FDI-Report_High_Risk_Low_Reward.pdf
 EECJ, Corporate Social Responsibility at the EU Level,  Advocacy Briefing 
















study	by	 the	New	Economics	 Foundation	 found	 that	 the	 rise	 in	




organised	 terror,	 but	 the	 same	 zeal	 is	 lacking	when	 it	 comes	 to	
corporate	or	 individual	 transactions.	 	“Different	 factors	 are	 likely	
to	 be	 at	 play	 in	 each	 country	 but,	 generally,	 both	 the	 creeping	




Then	 there	 is	 the	 critical	 issue	 of	“clean”	money	 exported	 from	
developing	 countries	 back	 to	 the	 North.	 	 Clean	 would	 be	 a	




of	ways	 in	which	 funds	 are	 extracted	 illicitly	but	not	 illegally,	 at	
least	not	yet,	but	a	salient	one	takes	the	form	of	privatisation	of	
public	goods	or	public	services	companies,	as	describe	earlier.		
9 Andrew Simms, The UK Interdependence Report, http://www.neweconomics. 
     org/gen/uploads/f2abwpumbrwp0y2l0s404200747.pdf, p. 
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economic	 growth	model	 assigns	 private	 investment	 the	 role	 of	
saviour	and	chief	engine	of	the	global	economy.	 	Unsurprisingly,	




Even	where	more	nationalist-minded	 authorities	 come	 to	office	
pledging	to	insure	control	and	transparency,	their	hands	are	tied	
by	 legally	binding	 	 investor	“protection”	provisions	 enshrined	 in	
free	trade	regimes	and	related	agreements	policed	by	the	World	
Trade	 Organisation.	 	 	 At	 other	moments,	 revenue	 shortages	 on	
the	 part	 of	 governments	 already	 saddled	 with	 debt	 servicing	
obligations	feed	privatisation.		In	Peru,	this	meant	selling	off	public	
electricity	 firms	 in	 2002	 and	other	 state	 assets	because	 the	 IMF	





Yet	 we	 are	 reportedly	 told	 by	 the	 neoliberal	 authorities	 that	
privatisation	 and	 liberalisation	 are	 synonymous	 with	 good	
governance	 and	 with	 the	 need	 to	 promote	 economic	 growth	
via	 the	private	 sector.	 	Over	 the	 course	of	 the	 last	 two	decades,	
unrelenting	 drives	 toward	 privatisation	 have	 meant	 that	
fundamental	 services	once	provided	or	at	 least	heavily	directed	
by	the	state	are	in	the	hands	of	private	firms,	under	new	rules	of	
90 “The Politics of Privatisation: Arequipa’s Anger, Peru’s Problem,





concentrated	 pharmaceutical	 industry,	 Consumers	 International	
found	“a	 staggering	 lack	 of	 transparency	 from	 drug	 companies	
about	these	practices”	[thinly	veiled	marketing	ploys	dressed	up	
as	 Social	 Responsibility	 initiatives].	 	 It	 claimed	 that	 “consumers	
are	 being	 misinformed	 about	 the	 benefits	 and	 applicability	 of	
















Over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 past	 decade,	 rich	 country	 governments	
have	gradually	arrived	at	agreements	to	insure	that	competition	
amongst	 corporations	 is	 “fair”	 and	 that	 bribery	 would	 be	
penalised.	 	 However	 the	 dominant	 anti-corruption	 focus	 places	
chief	 responsibility	 on	 the	 countries	 of	 the	 South,	 invoking	
considerations	 around	 development,	 governance	 and	 poverty	
almost	as	afterthoughts.		As	the	2003	DAC	study	admits,	“Much—
although	certainly	not	all—of	the	drive	behind	reducing	corruption	
91 Consumer International, “Old Habits Die Hard: A Consumer Perspective 
on Corporate Social Responsibility, Drug Promotion and the Pharmaceutical 
Industry,” www.consumersinternational.org  
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privatisation	 resulted	 in	a)	 lack	of	 access	 to	electricity	 in	poorer	
communities		hardest	hit	by	ensuing		tariff	increases		b)	a	foreign	
exchange	 risk—weakening	 local	 currencies	 means	 consumers	
must	 pay	 more	 in	 order	 for	 companies	 to	 maintain	 constant	
revenue	 in	 dollar	 terms,	 and	 c)	 falling	 profitability,	 employment	









a	 group	 of	 NGOs	 and	 citizens’	 organisations	 complained	 how	
“the	 US-funded	World	 Bank	 Group	 has	 provided	more	 than	 $5	
billion	 to	oil	extraction	projects	 since	1992,	while	devoting	only	
five	 percent	 of	 its	 energy	 budget	 to	 clean	 renewable	 resource	
development.		Moreover,	in	the	oil	sector,	82	percent	of	the	World	
92 DAC Network, Synthesis, p. 26
93 War on Want, Globeleq: the alternative report,  http://www.eldis.org/cf/rdr/rdr. 




US	and	Europe.”94	 	This	at	 a	 time	when	 the	 same	oil	 companies	
were	registering	record	profits.		Corruption?








intertwine.	 	 Describing	 the	 takeover	 phenomena	 in	 Russia,	 a	
Financial	Times	correspondent	wrote:	“The	oligarchs	were	so	called	
because	they	had	real	power,	 state	power.	 	They	wrote	 the	 laws.	
They	 appointed	ministers,	 often	 entire	 cabinets,	 and	made	 sure	
that	their	interests	are	served.		They	corrupted	the	new	governing	
legislative	 and	 bureaucratic	 class	 of	 Russia,	 in	 the	 centre,	 into	
regions	and	abroad….95”
But	state	capture	can	also	be	initiated	by	external	corporations	and	
facilitated	 by	 the	 international	 financial	 institutions.	 	 Corporate	
interests	 and	 multilateral	 rule-making	 and	 rule-enforcing	
institutions	can	constitute	a	form	of	state	capture	that	the	World	
Bank	and	others	conveniently	do	not	recognise	as	such.		The	result	
is	 much	 the	 same—profiteering	 through	 privatisation	 of	 state	
assets	and	deregulation,	with	the	added	injury	of	denationalisation	
in	many	cases.		
An	 unclassified	 study	 for	 the	 OECD’s	 Development	 Assistance	
Committee	 admitted	 that	 “privatisation,	 particularly	 in	 some	
of	 the	 transition	 countries,	 has	 been	 accompanied	 by	 serious	
corruption.	 	 Crony	 privatisation	 has	 skewed	wealth	 distribution,	
asset	 stripping	 has	 left	 banks	 bankrupted,	 unemployment	 has	
94 Sign-on letter, December 12, 2006, Oil Change International, 
     http://www.priceofoil.org/oilandstate/
95 John Lloyd, Financial Times, August 5, 2000.
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increased,	 and	 social	 services	have	declined.	 	To	what	 extent	 all	
of	this	was	caused	by	privatisation	alone	is	a	matter	of	judgment	
and	 perception.	 	 Some	 would	 argue	 that	 the	 alternatives	 to	
privatisation,	e.g.	doing	nothing,	would	be	worse...;	 the	potential	





state	 capture	 appears	 to	 thrive	 in	 such	 an	 environment	 of	 only	
partial	economic	and	political	liberalisation.”97
The	World	Bank	and	others	will	only	go	so	 far	as	 to	admit	 to	an	
“inequality	 of	 influence,”	 an	 understatement	 of	 the	 first	 order.	
It	 is	 capital	 and	 power	 that	 drives	 policy,	 and	 even	World	 Bank	
researchers	admit	that	such	unequal	access	to	power	becomes	a	
source	of	“legal”	corruption.98		Inequality,	however,	is	accentuated	
by	 the	 transfer	 of	 public	 resources	 to	 the	 private	 sector,	 i.e.	 by	
privatisation,	 de-regulation	 (and	 pro-corporate	 re-regulation)	
and	 liberalisation,	which	 are	 at	 the	 core	of	World	Bank	 and	 IMF	
insistence.		The	result	is	a	heightened	capacity	of	corporate	capital	
(domestic	 and/or	 foreign)	 to	 manipulate	 political,	 legal	 and	
regulatory	 institutions	 so	 as	 to	 preserve	 and	 extend	 privileged	
positions.		
Interestingly	 enough,	 researchers	 from	 the	World	 Bank	 Institute	
are	 beginning	 to	 admit	 the	 limitations	 of	 the	 conventional	
definition	of	corruption	as	 the	‘abuse	of	public	office	 for	private	
gain’99	 	This	 is	 further	evidence	that	more	attention	needs	to	be	
paid	to	corporations	and	corporate	patterns	of	corruption,	which	
also	affect	public	sector	corruption.		
96 DAC Network on Governance, Synthesis of Lessons Learned of Donor Practic-
es in Fighting Corruption,” DAC/DAC?GOVNET (200), 2 June, 200.  p. 22
97 Joel Hellman, “Beyond the ‘Grabbing Hand’ of Government in Transition: 
Facing up to ‘State Capture’ by the Corporate Sector,” Transition, (World Bank/
William Davidson Institute), 2000.
9 Joel Hellman and Daniel Kaufman, “The Inequality of Influence,” Presentation 
at Stanford Corruption Workshop, Jan 30-31, 2003. 
99 Daniel Kaufman and Pedro C. Vicente, Legal Corruption, www.worldbank.
org/wbi/governance/pubs/legalcorporate corruption.html
It	 stands	 to	 reason	 that	 corporations	 cannot	 be	 above	 anti-





the	world	 (338	billion	 in	1997).	 	Collusion	between	corporations	
and	public	officials	is	commonplace	and	usually	legal,	principally	
in	 the	 form	of	 lobbying	 influences	and	contributions	by	private	







rigged	 biddings	 for	 government	 procurement	 contracts,	 is	
one	 thing	 and	 the	 institutionalised	 legal	 corruption	 and	 state	








is	 inherent	 in	 the	 fundamentalist	 creed	 that	 “development”	 	 is	
the	 product	 of	 private	 investment	 and	 that	 private	 investment	
requires	the	“appropriate”	market-friendly	institutions	and	policies,	
i.e.,	“good	governance.”
But	 the	 “good	 governance”	 recipes	 for	 the	 South	 are	 vague	
as	 regards	 influence	 peddling—notwithstanding	 or	 perhaps	
because	 of	 the	 inability	 to	 deal	with	 the	 same	phenomenon	 at	
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are	cases	where	external	agents,	 including	corporations	and	the	
IFIs,	actually	draft	pro-corporate		legislation	(and	implementation	
norms)	 for	governments	 to	 approve.	 	 Both	 the	product	 and	 the	
process	should	be	considered	corrupt,	as	illegitimate	practices	are	
not	 only	 legalised	 but	 also	 now	protected	 by	 law	 enforcement.	
Here,	therefore,	we	are	no	longer	looking	at	a	form	of	corruption	




it	 is	a	 form	of	 legalised	corruption	or	“state	capture.”	–when	the	





corruption	 and	 state	 capture	 strain	 the	 conventional	 definition	
of	 corruption,	 and	 in	 consequence	 the	 overly-narrow	 scope	 of	
mainstream	anti-corruption	strategies.	 	Bank	researchers	believe	
that	legalised	corruption	thrives	where	economic	power	is	highly	
concentrated,	when	 forms	of	 collective	 representation	are	weak	









corruption	patterns,	which	 intertwine	with	 the	private,	 business	
and	class	 interests	of	the	“host”	country.	 	This	 is	 legal	corruption,	
which	the	Bank	itself	admits	as	an	empirical	category	but	resists	
applying	to	describe	corporate	patterns	of	expansion	elsewhere	
00 Cheryl Gray, Joel Hellman and Randi Ryterman, Anticorruption in Transition 
2: Corruption in Enterprise-State Interactions in Europe and Central Asia 1999-
2002, (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2004), p. .
in	 the	 world.101	 	 For	 example,	 the	 Indonesian	 government	 is	
pursuing	 a	 civil	 case	 against	 the	 former	 dictator	 Suharto	 and	
his	 sons	 to	 recoup	 up	 to	 $700	 million	 kept	 in	 seven	 so-called	




More	 important,	 they	 say,	 is	 looking	 at	 how	 he	 used	 his	 power	




Assembly	 and	 a	 docile	 House	 of	 Representatives….	 	 Can	 legal	
action	be	taken	against	Suharto’s	children	when	the	policies	that	
led	 to	 their	 enrichment	were	all	government-sanctioned?	 	Only,	
it	would	 seem,	 if	 it	 can	be	proven	 that	 the	 state	 incurred	 losses	
as	a	result.102	 	And	what	of	the	World	Bank’s	own	role,	providing	
an	almost	automatic	$1	billion	a	year	to	the	Suharto	regime	that	
later	 could	 “legally”	 turn	 up	 in	 Suharto-controlled	 accounts?103	
No	one	believes	the	IFIs	were	ignorant	of	what	was	taking	place	
in	 Indonesia,	but	apparently	 the	agencies	did	not	wish	 to	upset	
relations	with	the	government.




“normalised,”	 benefiting	 a	 number	 of	 political,	 entrepreneurial,	
media	and	judicial	figures.104
0 Daniel Kaufmann and Pedro C. Vicente, “Legal Corruption” (October, 200), 
http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/legalcorporatecorruption.html
02 “Yudhoyono’s Dilemma,” The Straits Times, (Singapore), May 2, 200.
103 Following the fall of General Suharto in 199, the loans dropped to about 400 
million a year until 2004.  “World Bank Again Giving Largo Loans to Indonesia,” 
The New York Times, December 2, 200.
04 Luis Moreno Ocampo, “Corruption and Democracy,” ReVista, Harvard 
Review of Latin America, http://drclas.fas.harvard.edu/databank/Userfiles/3/29/
revista_ss0_web.pdf
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IX.  Looting and Lending:




interest	 rates	 following	a	period	of	aggressive	 loan	peddling	by	
Northern	 banks	 and	 governments	 to	Third	World	 governments,	
which	took	on	the	loans	for	both	public	and	private	ends.			By	the	
1980s	the	debt	of	developing	countries	had	reached	some	US$567	
billion.	 	 The	 question	 that	 needs	 to	 be	 posed	 is	 whether	 those	
debts	are	legitimate—i.e.,	whether	they	were	contracted	against	




loans	 to	 pay	 the	 old	 ones,	 and	 with	 this	 the	 stage	 was	 set	 for	
extortion	 and	 entrapment	 by	 way	 of	 the	 so-called	 structural	
adjustment	policies	(SAPs).		Aimed	at	building	up	state	capacities	
to	 service	 their	 debts,	 SAPs	 also	 required	 reshaping	 countries’	
financial	and	economic	systems.	 	This	included	adopting	export-
led	 growth	 models,	 making	 stringent	 budgetary	 cuts	 (largely	
in	 services),	 devaluating,	 imposing	 new	 taxes,	 privatising	 state-
owned	enterprises,	 raising	 interest	 rates,	devaluing	 the	currency	
for	export	competitiveness,	and	liberalising	finances	and	trade.




a	 comprehensive	 perspective,	 therefore,	 all	 three	 categories	 are	
examples	of	 corruption.	 	Nonetheless,	 subsequent	governments	
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terms	of	subjugation	and	exploitation	seemed	to	come	back	full	
force	with	 South	 economies	 providing	 cheap	 raw	 commodities	
and	cheap	labour	as	demanded	by	Northern	economies.		Export	
market	dependence	now	followed	and	reinforced	debt	domination,	
provoking	 mal-development	 and	 mounting	 levels	 of	 poverty.	
	
In	social,	financial	and	ecological	terms,	the	outcomes	of	imposing	




the	 trade	 conditions	 imposed	 by	 SAPs.	 	 Trade	 liberalisation	 is	









countries,	 but	 also	 because	 it	 excludes	 debts	 claimed	 by	 other	
major	financial	 institutions.	 	 From	 the	anti-corruption	and	debt-
illegitimacy	 campaign	 perspectives,	 the	 G8	 proposal	 evades	
accountability	 for	 the	 debt	 burdens	 accrued	 on	 account	 of	




of	 the	 IMF-World	 Bank	 for	 privatisation,	 financial	 and	 trade	
liberalisation.	 	 Not	 surprisingly,	 the	 proposal	 was	 immediately	
accepted	 by	 the	 IFIs	 in	 their	 annual	 meetings	 later	 that	 year.	
		
Africa’s	 debt	 burden	 today	 amounts	 to	 US$300	 billion,	 with	
over	 US$15	 billion	 being	 spent	 annually	 on	 debt	 repayments	
to	 wealthy	 nations	 and	 institutions.	 	 Debt	 campaigners	 insist	
that	 the	 debt	 should	 be	 repudiated	 because	 of	 its	 illegitimacy	
and	corrupt	origins.	 	To	them,	 it	 is	morally	wrong	to	pay	debt	at	
the	 expense	 of	 government	 capacity	 to	 spend	 on	 basic	 social	
services,	 environmental	 security,	 food	 security,	 or	 of	 diversifying	
its	 economic	 production	 and	 reclaiming	 its	 sovereignty.	 	 Debt	
campaigners	insisted	that	Africa’s	debt	was	illegitimate	because:




•	 The	 international	 financial	 institutions	 and	 northern	
industrialised	governments	used	the	deepening	cycle	of	
indebtedness	as	a	tool	of	domination	to	create	favourable	
conditions	 for	predatory	 corporate	 expansion	 to	 further	
loot	and	plunder	Africa’s	human	and	natural	resources.
•	 In	this	cyclical	process	Africa	has	repaid	this	debt	several	
times	over	and	no	 longer	do	we	 just	 shout	–	WE	DON’T	
OWE,	 WE	 WON’T	 PAY,	 but	 declare	 that	 AFRICA	 IS	 THE	
CREDITOR.”
Campaigners	went	on	to	demand	full	unconditional	cancellation	
of	 Africa’s	 debt,	 along	 with	 reparations	 for	 damage	 caused	 by	
debt	 devastation	 and	 a	 comprehensive	 audit	 to	 determine	 the	
full	 extent	 and	 real	 nature	 of	Africa’s	 illegitimate	debt,	 the	 total	
payments	made	to	date	and	the	amount	owed	to	Africa.105
At	 the	 4th	World	 Social	 Forum,	 a	 coalition	 of	 debt	 campaigns	
and	 movements	 organised	 a	 Peoples’	 International	 Tribunal	
on	 Debt	 Illegitimacy.	 	 At	 its	 concluding	 session	 held	 in	 April,	
2002,	 the	 Tribunal	 declared	 all	 external	 debt	 illegitimate	 and,	
thus	 demanded	 its	 immediate	 repudiation	 and	 cancellation.	
	
Judge	 Dumisa	 Ntsebeza,	 former	 chief	 investigator	 of	 the	 South	
African	Truth	and	Reconciliation	Commission	and	one	of	the	four	
members	 of	 the	 Tribunal	 Presidium	 officiating	 in	 the	 session,	
had	 the	 judgment	 read:	“In	 return	 for	 the	 wealth	 illegitimately	
	
0  Africa Jubilee South Declaration at the Illegitimate Debt Audit Workshop, 
June, 2004, http://www.jubileesouth.org/news/EEpEuuEVAuBwgaUCpB.shtml
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The	 prosecution	 also	 demonstrated	 proof	 through	 numbers	
that	 service	 on	 the	 external	 debt	 results	 in	 a	 net	 transfer	 of	
resources	from	the	South	to	the	North.	 In	1980,	the	South	owed	
US$567	 billion	 dollars,	 yet	 since	 then	 it	 has	 paid	 US$3,450	
billion,	 which	 is	 over	 six	 times	 the	 amount	 of	 the	 actual	 debt.	
Moreover,	the	creditors	continue	to	claim	that	they	are	still	owed	
over	 US$2	 trillion—three	 and	 a	 half	 times	 more	 than	 in	 1980.	
	
In	the	course	of	its	deliberations	in	Porto	Alegre	in	January,	2002,	
the	 Tribunal	 received	 testimony	 from	 21	 victims	 and	 expert	
witnesses	 from	 countries	 in	 Africa,	 Asia,	 Latin	 America	 and	 the	
Caribbean.	 	 Key	 testimonies	built	 the	 case	on	 the	 accusation	of	
debt	 illegitimacy	based	on	 the	 impacts	of	debt	 service	 and	 the	
consequence	of	redirecting	funds	away	from	state	social	service	
obligations.	 	 	Particularly	compelling	were	 the	African	witnesses	
who	documented	the	consequences	 for	 the	region	of	having	to	






debts,	 usurious	 interest	 rates	 and	 odious	 debt.	 	 	 Following	 the	




relief	 as	 leverage	 for	 more	 conditionalities,	 witnesses	
presented	their	experiences	and	evidence	of	 the	use	of	







of	 survival	 for	 Southern	 communities,	 contamination	
of	 the	 atmosphere	 through	 excessive	 greenhouse	 gas	
emissions,	the	erection	of	mega-projects	geared	to	profit	
generation,	 the	 appropriation	 of	 traditional	 knowledge	
and	 seeds,	 the	 dumping	 of	 toxic	 wastes	 in	 the	 South,	
and	the	consequences	of	Northern	financial	and	political	
support	for	armed	conflict;
•	 On	 the	 accusation	 of	 debt	 illegitimacy	 based	 on	 the	


















by	 the	 Duvalier	 family	 dictatorship	 (1957-1986).	 	 Independent	
economists	 came	 to	 calculate	 that	 Jean-Claude	 Duvalier	 stole	
$900	million	from	the	Haitian	treasury.		The	lending	was	an	act	of	
corruption,	but	Haitians	are	now	forced	to	pay	the	corrupt	loans.	
0 People’s Tribunal declares external debt illegitimate, calls for the 
decommissioning of IMF-World Bank, (April, 2002), http://www.jubileesouth.org/
news/EpklEpEEVVGwDpzvZd.shtml
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What	 is	more,	 the	World	 Bank	 and	 IMF	 insist	 that	 Haiti	 comply	
with	 economic	 policies	 such	 as	 privatisation	 of	 basic	 services	
or	 increased	 trade	 liberalisation	 before	 obtaining	 full	 debt	
cancellation.107		
A	 study	 by	 the	 New	 Economics	 Foundation	 documents	 how	
Indonesia	overpaid	its	recorded	debt	by	US$151	billion,	which	in	
fact	translates	into	a	cumulative	net	transfer	to	the	North	of	138	





the	 regimes	propped	up	and	enriched	by	 these	 loans;	 secondly,	






the	 historical,	 moral	 and	 environmental	 damages	 incurred	 by	
Western	colonialists,	including	their	support	to	dictatorships	and	
regimes	 such	as	Apartheid,	 Jubilee	 South	 assumed	 the	position	
of	“Don’t	owe,	won’t	pay.”	 	 In	essence,	organisations	in	the	South	
and	 some	 in	 the	North	 set	 aside	 the	 IFI	 and	“donor”	 references	
to	“debt	 relief	 for	 the	poorest	 countries”	and	 instead	demanded	






07 Debayani Kar and Tom Ricker, “IDB Debt Cancellation for Haiti” (Silver City, 
       NM and Washington, DC: Foreign Policy in Focus, December 7, 200).
08 Steve Mandel, “Odious Debt: Debt Relief as if Morals Mattered”  
       (September, 200), http://www.neweconomics.org/gen/uploads  
       v3gdvw45bflbyn55gy1fwr4514092006174700.pdf
the	debts	illegitimate,	which	meant	that	addressing	mass	poverty	




Extensive	 work	 by	 NGOs	 and	 analysts	 shows	 how	 repayment	
of	 illegitimate	 debts,	 new	 indebtedness,	 profit	 repatriation	 by	











use	 of	 tax	 havens,	 also	 amount	 to	 illegitimate	 (although	 not	
necessarily	illegal)	resource	extraction.		Privatisation	run	amok	has	






The	 opportunities	 for	 enrichment	 are	 many	 and	 the	 internal	






109 William Robinson, Transnational Conflicts, Central America, Social Change  
       and Globalization, (Verso: 200), p. 7.
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A	 particularly	 despicable,	 yet	 entirely	 legal	 form	 of	 corruption	
affecting	the	poorest	countries	takes	the	form	of	companies	that	
buy	up	the	debt	of	poor	nations	cheaply	and	then	sue	for	the	full	
value	plus	 interest.	 	Because	 the	holders	never	expect	 to	collect	
on	these	debts,	they	sell	them	at	a	very	low	price	to	the	vultures,	
which	then	resort	to	political	muscle,	bribery	or	 lawsuits	against	




















US	 billionaire	 Paul	 Singer	 is	 the	 founding	 father	 of	 the	 vulture	




if	 it	didn’t	give	him	$58	million.	 	He	got	 the	$58	million.	 	 Singer	




creditors.	 	 The	 US	 courts	 agreed,	 allowing	 him	 to	 seek	 tripled	






On	15	 February	2007,	 a	 London	 court	 rejected	 the	 size,	but	not	
the	nature,	of	Donegal’s	claim,	lowering	the	“award”	to	20	million.	
The	 ruling	 provides	 legal	 cover	 to	 one	 of	 the	 most	 predatory	
banking	practices	in	existence,	but	more	importantly	undermines	
governmental	 capacity	 to	 spend	 on	 social	 services.	 	 	 Zambian	
presidential	 adviser	 and	 consultant	 to	 Oxfam,	 Martin	 Kalunga-
Banda,	 believes	 the	 42	 million	 was	 equal	 to	 all	 the	 debt	 relief	
received	 in	 2006:	 “It	 means	 30,000	 children	 who	 would	 have	
benefited	from	going	to	school	free	will	not	be	able	to	do	so.”111	
To	his	 credit,	 Britain’s	 then-Chancellor	 of	 the	 Exchequer	Gordon	
Brown	 told	 the	United	Nations	 in	2002	 that	 this	 form	of	 cynical	
profiteering	was	perverse	and	immoral.		“We	particularly	condemn	
the	 perversity	where	 vulture	 funds	 purchase	 debt	 at	 a	 reduced	
price	and	make	a	profit	from	suing	the	debtor	country	to	recover	
the	 full	 amount	 owned—a	 morally	 outrageous	 outcome.”	 	 Its	
continued	legality,	however,	makes	a	mockery	of	G8	“debt	relief,”	
which	works	for	the	benefit	of	bankers	instead	of	the	South.112	
Sameer	Dossani,	Director	of	50	Years	 is	Enough,	 sums	 it	up	well:	
“The	Donegal	case	in	Zambia	shows	just	how	skewed	the	current	







110 “Vulture Fund” Company Seeks $40 Million Payment from Zambia on $4 
Million Debt, http://www.democracynow.org/article.pl?sid=07/02//28209; 
http://jubileeusa.typepad.com/
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nature	of	the	county’s	economy	itself.		Not	surprisingly,	the	country’s	
economy	 is	 shaped	by	 these	conditions	 to	benefit	 international	
investors	who	make	money	 from	deregulated	financial	markets,	
transnational	 corporations	 that	make	money	 from	 privatisation	
policies	and	buyers	of	commodities	who	make	money	from	trade	
liberalisation.		All	these	policies,	which	further	enrich	these	elites	
in	Europe	and	North	America,	 further	 impoverish	the	country	 in	
question	and	condemn	it	to	a	never-ending	cycle	of	debt.”113
113 Sameer Dossani, “Investors Aim to Profit from Zambia’s Poverty,” Foreign  
       Policy in Focus, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/40
X.  Anti-Corruption:




jury	of	 its	own	actions.	 	There	are	a	number	of	 reasons	why	 the	
Bank	is	 ill-placed	to	lead	global	anti-corruption:	first,	by	virtue	of	
the	Bank’s	own	charter,	governments	are	its	“clients”	and	political	
matters	 are,	 nominally	 at	 least,	 outside	 its	 mandate.	 	 Second,	
any	WB	 strategy	 is	 predicated	 on	 neoliberal	 economic	 growth	
formulas	and	macro-economic	frameworks	that	take	precedence	
over	all	else.		Civil	society	anti-corruption	campaigns,	particularly	
community	 and	 trade	 union-based	 ones,	 have	 no	 reason	 to	
subordinate	 methodology,	 analysis	 and	 actions	 to	 the	 Bank’s	
framework.		
According	 to	 the	 Bank,	 “corruption	 sabotages	 polices	 and	
programmes	that	aim	to	reduce	poverty,	so	attacking	corruption	
is	 critical	 to	 the	 achievement	of	 the	bank’s	 overarching	mission	
of	poverty	 reduction.”114	 	However,	poverty	 reduction	 is	 in	most	




In	 addition,	 the	 Bank	 suffers	 from	 an	 overwhelming	 lack	 of	
legitimacy	 and	 credibility	 with	 many	 civil	 society	 groupings	






4  See Bank Website www.worldbank.org and “Debt briefing for Eurodad 
        corruption, debt and aid meeting,” June 200, www.eurodad.org.
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b.	 The	overriding	focus	on	economic	liberalisation;
c.	 The	 level	 of	 corruption	 being	 found	 in	 Bank	
projects;








from	 the	 enduring	 inequalities	 and	 injustices	 at	
the	 international	 level,	 including	 rich	 country	
trade	and	investment	promotion	policies	
In	 short,	 the	 Bank	 is	 already	 too	 powerful	 to	 be	 assigned	 yet	 a	
new	sphere	of	influence	and	too	pro-corporate	finance	to	assure	
an	 even-handed	 public/private	 approach.	 	 Taking	 the	 task	 to	
heart,	however,	the	WB	has,	in	the	eyes	of	some	donors,	gone	too	
far	 by	 imposing	 new	 conditionality	 on	 several	 of	 its	“clients”	 by	
freezing	or	cancelling	loans	or	delaying	debt	cancellation	because	
of	 alleged	corruption.	Writing	about	 the	 tensions	over	 the	 issue	






A	 report	 by	 CIDSE,	 a	 European	 coalition	 of	 development	NGOs,	




 Steven Weisman, “Wolfowitz Corruption Drive Rattles World Bank,” The New 





largely	 on	 its	 own	 institutional	 mandate,	 its	 economic	 growth	
formula	and	the	ensuing	policy	prescription	agenda.		It	pretends	
that	governance	standards	are	non-ideological	or	political,	because	
the	 Bank	 is	 not	 supposed	 to	 be	 involved	 in	 political	 matters.	
Looking	to	the	WB	for	guidance	in	this	regard,	as	donor	agencies	
and	 NGOs	 including	 Transparency	 International	 often	 do,	 is	 to	
accept,	tacitly	or	not,	the	neoliberal	corporate-driven	development	
growth	model	that	the	Bank	upholds	and	propagates.		










rights	 and	 broad-based	 development....	 	 The	 World	 Bank	 has	
neither	the	mandate,	the	legitimacy	nor	the	capacity	to	become	
a	global	 arbiter	on	 corruption.	Whilst	 corruption	 is	 a	 concern	 in	
many	developing	countries	around	the	world,	recent	events	in	the	
UK	(cash	for	peerages)	and	the	US	(Enron,	Katrina	relief )	illustrate	
that	 it	 is	 far	 from	being	a	‘poor	 country	problem.’	 	The	problem	
needs	to	be	seen	in	the	context	of	other	challenges	that	countries	
face	in	building	democratic	developmental	states	and	combating	
poverty....	 	The	World	Bank	 should	 focus	 its	 energies	on	 its	 own	
operations	 and	 not	move	 into	 the	 role	 of	‘global	 policeman’	 on	
corruption.	 	 It	cannot	be	both	 judge	and	 jury	of	 its	own	actions	
 CIDSE Background Paper, The World Bank’s Strategy on Governance and 
Anticorruption: A civil society perspective, August, 200, http://www.cidse.org/
docs/20060231619535230.pdf
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In	 sum,	 good	 governance	 for	 the	 Bank	 means	 establishing	
market	economy	with	the	“appropriate	macroeconomic	stability,”	
stable	property	rights,	enforceable	contracts,	 transparency,	trade	
liberalisation,	 repatriation	 of	 profits,	 privatised	 or	 public/private	
partnerships	for	service	deliveries	and	mechanisms	to	fight	official	




to	 block	 proposals	 for	 the	“populist”	 altering	 of	 state	 structures	
to	bring	them	closer	to	citizenries.	 	From	the	Bank’s	perspective,	
fighting	corruption	is	an	institutional	and	administrative	task,	not	
7 CIDSE, Eurodad, Afrodad and Latindad letter to Paul Wolfowitz on the World 
Bank Governance and Anti-corruption Strategy, August 7, 2006,   http://www.cidse.
org/docs/20060071455354490.pdf
11 Joseph Stiglitz, Corporate Corruption, “The conflicts of Interest Driving US 
Financial Scandals are being Replicated on a Global Scale,” Guardian (London), 
July 4, 2002, available on http://www.commondreams.org/views02/0704-02.htm





of	 pubic	 policy.	 	 As	 with	 the	 Bank,	 many	 South	 governments	
feel	 they	 cannot	 effectively	 challenge	 the	 IMF	 because	 of	 their	
financial	dependence	or	because	of	the	“gate-keeper”	role	played	
by	 the	 IMF	 in	giving	 the	green	 light	 for	 financing.120	 	The	 state-
market	 relationship	 is	 at	 the	 core	of	 the	 IFI	 and	“donor”	 agenda	
needing	 to	 be	 enshrined	 through	“good	 governance”	 practices	
but	the	emphasis	is	on	the	market	and	not	the	state,	on	providing	
assurances	for	capital	at	the	expense	of	society.
Conditionality	 is	 needed	 on	 the	 IFIs	 and	 on	 the	 operations	 of	
corporate	and	financial	combines	of	 the	North.	 	 Instead,	 the	WB	
and	IMF	continue	to	push	their	versions	of	good	governance,	and	
use	sticks	to	get	there.		Taking	advantage	of	a	developing	country’s	






externally	driven	process	would	 invariably	discredit	 the	 content	
and	 product,	 not	 least	 from	 the	 standpoint	 of	 proper—bottom	
up—democratic	 process	 in	 which	 concerns	 of	 sovereignty	 and	
self-determination	are	fundamental	core	elements.
World	Bank	researchers	came	up	with	the	notion	of	“state	capture”	
unsuspecting	 perhaps	 that,	 in	 the	 post	 9/11	 security-obssessed	
world,	 corruption	 also	 become	 synonymous	 with	“state	 failure”	
and	threats	to	big	power	“national	security”.				If	a	corrupt	state	is	
unable	to	live	up	to	US	“security”	standards,	it	could	become	not	




20  Daniel Bradlow, “IMF Identity Crisis,” Foreign Policy in Focus, De-
cember 2, 200, www.fpif.org
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it	 will	 become	 a	 further	 pretext	 for	“aid	 selectivity”	 at	 best	 and	
external	intervention	at	worse.
But	one	must	of	course	look	further	and	deeper	for	the	causes	of	
state	 fragility/corruption.	 	 As	 this	 paper	 has	 strongly	 suggested,	
it	 may	 be	 the	 liberalisation	 and	 privatisation	 model	 itself	 that	
generates	 the	 very	 weaknesses	 the	 US	 and	 its	 allies	 are	 now	
complaining	 about.	 	 As	 US	 political	 scientist	 Susan	Woodward	

















countries,	 the	search	began	 for	other	explanations.	 	That	search,	
however,	did	not	set	aside	the	earlier	premises	of	neo-classical	free-






by	 poor	 governance	 and	public	 sector	 corruption.	 	On	 June	 11,	
2005,	 the	 G8	 finance	 ministers,	 reflecting	 the	 new	 consensus,	
stated,	“We	 reaffirm	our	view	 that	 in	order	 to	make	progress	on	
2 Susan Woodward, “Fragile States: Exploring the Concept,” paper presented 
to the “States and Security” Learning Group, November 29, 2004, www.fride.org
social	and	economic	development,	it	is	essential	that	developing	
countries	put	in	place	the	polices	for	economic	growth,	sustainable	
development	 and	 poverty	 reduction:	 sound,	 accountable	 and	
transparent	institutions	and	policies;	macroeconomic	stability;	the	
increased	fiscal	transparency	essential	to	tackle	corruption,	boost	
private	 sector	 development	 and	 attract	 investment;	 a	 credible	
legal	 framework;	 and	 the	elimination	of	 impediments	 to	private	
investment,	both	domestic	and	foreign.”122
That	 consensus	 misses	 many	 of	 the	 fundamentals,	 chiefly	 the	
political	nature	of	governance	and,	 in	many	cases,	of	corruption	
itself,	 as	 they	are	embedded	 in	wider	 social,	political	 and	global	
structures.	 	 Nongovernmental	 development	 advocates	 such	
as	CIDSE	 argue	 that	“deep	 social	 inequality	 and	 elite	 capture	of	
power	 and	 state	 resources	 perpetuate	 grand	 corruption	 and	
unaccountable	 governance.	 	 Powerful	 political	 and	 economic	









How	 convenient	 that	 privatisation,	 or	 more	 accurately	
corporatisation,	 emerges	 as	 a	 stellar	 way	 of	 fighting	 corruption	
in	 state-owned	 enterprises	 and	 utilities—all	 on	 the	 dubious	
assumption	 that	 the	 market	 is	 better	 at	 self-regulating	 against	
corruption	 than	 the	 state	 itself.	 	 As	 the	 CIDSE	 study	 argues,	“an	
automatic	assumption	that	a	better	governed	state	is	one	in	which	
government’s	scope	to	regulate	is	reduced,	markets	are	liberalised	
and	 public	 services	 are	 contracted	 out	 to	 private	 providers	 is	
22 G8 Finance Ministers’ Statement on Development and Debt, G8 Finance  
       Ministers’ Conclusions on Development, London, 10-11 June, 2005.
2 CIDSE, “The World Bank’s Strategy on Governance and Anticorruption— 
        a civil society perspective,” A CIDSE Background Paper, (August, 200), 
        p. .  http://www.cidse.org 
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both	deeply	problematic	and	profoundly	political.”124		The	bias	is	
ideological	 as	well	 as	 institutional	 self-interest,	 as	 the	 Bank	 and	
“donors”	 also	 see	 corruption	 as	 a	 threat	 to	 their	 own	 resources	
and	reputation	and	to	the	survival	of	the	aid	industry	itself,	often	
complicit	 in	 lending	 to	 governments	 that	 lacked	 democratic	




mission.	 	And	 ideology	 remains	at	 the	centre	of	 that	mission	by	
way	 of	 the	 hegemonic	 perspective	 that	 sets	 aside	 the	 private	
sector’s	role	as	a	corruptor	in	corporate-dominated	governments	
while	proceeding	to	flagellate	the	public	sector,	particularly	under	
left-oriented	governments.	 	Transparency	 International,	 founded	
by	a	former	World	Bank	official,	allows	the	private	sector	to	largely	
define	the	“corruption	index”	for	their	respective	countries.125		Yet	






partnerships”	 (arrangements),	 the	 landscape	 of	 public	 access	
to	 information	 shifts,	 as	 indeed	 does	 the	 landscape	 of	 public	
power	and	public	control.	 	 Investor/state	disputes	acquire	a	new	
dynamic	 under	 such	 PPPs,	 leaving	 general	 public	 interests	 as	
considerations	 secondary	 to	 investor	 rights.	 	No	one	can	 ignore	
the	 fact	 that	 North/South	 international	 financial	 transactions	




to	 international	 bodies	 and	“donors”	 is	 not	 the	 answer,	which	 is	
24 Ibid., p. 7.
2 “Transparencia Internacional: ¿Movimiento Anticorrupción o Instrumento 
Hegemónico?,” Inforpress Centroamericana, Informe Especial, November 24, 
200. 












Rights	 and	 Transnational	 Corporations	 and	 other	 Business	




including	 human	 rights	 and	 humanitarian	 law,	 it	 should	 not	 be	
forgotten	 that	businesses	also	have	 responsibilities	under	 these	
legal	regimes.		Indeed,	as	part	of	their	obligations	to	protect	human	
rights	under	 their	 jurisdiction,	 states	are	under	a	duty	 to	ensure	
that	business	acts	accordingly…	calling	for	recommendations	as	
to	 how	 states	 can	 effectively	 regulate	 transnational	 businesses	
with	 regards	 to	 human	 rights,	 including	 through	 international	
cooperation.”127			
Although	more	efforts	are	being	made	to	insure	minimal	corporate	




ideologically	 unfashionable.	 	 As	 a	 reflection	 of	 the	 ideological	
hegemony,	 the	 international	 system	does	not	have	mechanisms	
to	stand	up	to	human	rights	and	environmental	damages	caused	
2 Lidy Nacpil, “Discussion Notes on Principles of “Responsible” Financing, 
Conditionalities v. Terms and Mutual Obligations,” unpublished.
27 Joint NGO response to interim report of the Special Representatives on Human 
Rights…, http://web.amnesty.org/library/ENGIOR000200 
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by	 transnational	 companies.	 	 There	 are	 a	 number	 of	 guidelines	
(namely	 OECD	 Guidelines	 for	 multinational	 enterprises,	 ILO	






28  State capture is defined as the “purchase” of law and policies by 
corporations.  Joel Hellman, Geraint Jones and Daniel Kaufmann, “Beyond the 
‘Grabbing Hand’ of Government in Transition: Facing up to ‘State Capture’ by 
the Corporate Sector,” Transition, World Bank/William Davidson Institute/SITE/
BOFIT  (2000).  
XI. Conclusions and Recommendations: 






corruption	 as	 a	manifestation	 of	 imperfect	 or	 black	markets,	 in	
turn	generated	by	excess	state	intervention.			The	more	the	state	
intervenes	 and	 the	more	 bureaucratic	 procedures	 it	 sets	 down,	
argues	this	view,	the	greater	the	propensity	for	“informal”	parallel	
markets	and	illicit	parallel	channels—the	seedbed	for	corruption	













she	can	or	 cannot	do.	 	 It’s	 a	 shame	 that	 the	 same	 insistence	on	
precision	does	not	by	and	large	apply	to	the	private	sector	where,	




129 Yves Meny, “Corrupción ‘fin de siglo’: Cambio, crisis y transformación de los 
valores,” www.unesco.org/issj/rics149/meny149.htm
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with	 the	 legal	 and	 nothing	more.	 	 As	 Karl	 Polanyi	 pointed	 out	
decades	 ago,	 the	 historically	 specific	 “great	 transformation”	
(because	it	was	not	always	like	this	and	does	not	have	to	be	like	









behind	 even	 the	meek	public	 attempts	 to	 codify	 and	 outlaw	 it,	
particularly	 at	 the	 international	 level.	 	What	 is	 clear	 today,	 after	
at	 least	a	decade	of	experience,	 is	 that	global	neoliberal	 rules	of	
engagement,	 far	 from	being	 the	panacea	 for	 ending	 corruption	
as	 the	 ideologues	and	 the	G8	would	have	us	believe,	 is	 leading	
precisely	in	the	opposite	direction.		Globalisation	is	not	guilty	by	
130 See the examples cited by Yves Meny, “Corrupción ‘fin de siglo’: Cambio, crisis 
y transformación de los valores,” www.unesco.org/issj/rics149/meny149.htm
omission	 but	 by	 commission.	 	There	 is	 no	 reason	 to	 give	 it	 the	
benefit	 of	 the	 doubt—it	 was	 never	 a	 situation	 of	 transnational	
forces	 moving	 into	 uncharted	 lawless	 waters,	 but	 rather	 of	
deliberately	and	purposively	shaping	the	external	environment	to	
the	needs	and	interests	of	globalised	corporate	capital.
Therefore,	 corruption-laden	 globalisation	 is	 not	 impersonal	 or	
inevitably	development.	 	New	corruption-friendly	rules	continue	
to	be	created	by	new	actors	(albeit	upheld	by	the	same	powerful	
states)	 with	 only	 meagre	 advances	 in	 global	 regulation	 and	




or	 unwilling	 to	 contain	 the	 activities	 of	 the	 international	 crime	
network	 and/or	 deal	 with	 illegitimate	 international	 economic	








more	 socially-sensitive	 behaviour	 by	 ethical	 considerations;	 Bill	
Gates’	foundations	or	Kofi	Annan’s	Global	compact	come	to	mind.	
But	even	impartial	academic	specialists	are	not	convinced.	 	With	
respect	 to	 transnational	 corporations,	 Susan	 Rose	 Ackerman	
argues	that	“the	persistence	of	corruption	involving	such	important	
economic	actors	suggests	that	their	managers	and	owners	believe	
that	 it	 is	 economically	 beneficial,	 in	 spite	 of	 the	 costs	 to	 host	
countries	and	the	costs	to	the	reputation	of	global	businesses.”131	
Heavy	 public	 relations	 campaigning	 aside,	 the	 reality	 seems	 to	
be	 that	 neither	 short-	 nor	 long-term	 corporate	 profit-making	
131 Rose-Ackerman, Susan, “’Grand’ Corruption and the Ethics of Global Business” 
(October 1999). Yale Law School, Program for Studies in Law, Economics and 
Public Policy, Working Paper No. 22. http://ssrn.com/abstract=191352
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is	 concerned	 with	 avoiding	 corruption	 as	 an	 ethical	 issue,	 any	
more	than	it	seriously	addresses	environmental	or	human	rights	
considerations	 voluntarily.	 	 Despite	 some	 legal	 advances	 and	






and	 the	 question	 of	 what	 is	 to	 be	 done	 leads	 us	 down	 a	 path	
similar	 to	 that	 suggested	 by	 the	 conventional	 anti-corruption	
campaigners.		We	agree	there	is	a	need	to	understand	the	incentives	
for	making	 and	 accepting	“payoffs,”	 be	 they	 institutionalised	 or	
personal,	 legalised	or	 not.	 	To	 change	 this	 one	must	proceed	 in	
two	directions,	one	of	which	 is	 to	 legally	 reduce	the	spaces	and	
“opportunities”	 that	 allow	 for	 illegitimate	 financial	 gain	 at	 the	
national	and	global	level.		The	pious	concern	of	donors	for	improved	





social	movements.	 	 Peoples’	 organisations,	 by	 their	 very	 nature,	
will	 tend	 to	 expose	 and	deal	with	 the	 causes	of	 corruption—as	
opposed	to	advocacy	groups	proposing	policy	measures	to	deal	
with	symptoms	of	that	phenomenon.		
The	 second	 parallel	 and	 reinforcing	 avenue	 is	 to	 engage	 in	
sustained	education	in	order	to	shift	the	attitudes	of	citizens	and	
politicians	 away	 from	 corrupt	 relationships,	 be	 they	personal	 or	
institutional.		Public	intolerance	and	hence	involvement	more	likely	
to	grow	out	of	people’s	recognition	that	corruption,	ill-conceived	

















and	 officials.	 	 Organised	 public	 efforts	 to	 combat	 corruption	 in	
this	 sense	 are	 central	 to	 the	 task	 of	 deepening	 the	 practice	 of	
democracy.		Creating	a	state	whose	citizens	expect	and	receive	fair	
treatment,	not	only	from	officials	but	from	each	other,	constitutes	
a	 core	 part	 of	 any	 project	 for	 democratic	 social	 transformation.	







the	 greatest	 threat	 to	 democratic	 governance	 and	 democracy.	
Corporate	 power,	 upheld	 and	 protected	 by	 the	 international	





playing	field	 that	 renders	 the	game	dishonest.	There	 is	no	 form	
of	 corruption	 worse	 than	 exploitation,	 and	 that	 includes	 the	
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of	 fair	 redistribution	 and	 achieving	 equitable	 environmentally	
sustainable	 development,	 if	 not	 democracy	 itself.	 	 Corruption	 is	
embedded	 in	 the	 very	 structures	 and	 processes	 where	 nations	
and	people	interact	or,	better	said,	exploit	and	are	exploited.		
Our	 vision	 of	 the	 anti-corruption	 struggle	 accepts	 the	 notion	
that	corruption	 is	also	a	matter	of	governance,	but	we	conceive	
of	 governance	 as	 a	 political	 matter,	 not	 a	 managerial	 and	
administrative	 one—which	 is	 to	 say	 that	 we	 place	 social	 and	
economic	 power	 relations,	 both	 within	 and	 outside	 of	 nation	
states,	at	the	core	of	the	discussion,	strategy	and	action	for	fighting	
corruption,	 as	 an	 empowering	 and	 transformational	 framework.	











and	 citizens,	 particularly	 in	 the	 poorer	 countries.	 	 Only	 new	
alliances	 can	 effect	 changes	 in	 the	 global	 balance	 of	 forces	 to	
attack	 corruption	 in	 its	 economic,	 social	 and	 environmental	
manifestations.	 	 Changes	 in	 the	 balance	 of	 power	 between	
governments	 North	 and	 South,	 but	 also	 between	 organised	
popular	movements	and	 their	own	government	 forms	part	of	a	
strategy	 that	 will	 strengthen	 accountable	 democratic	 political	
entities	vis-à-vis	unaccountable	corporate	power.
Tackling	 systemic	 global	 corruption	 also	 means	 reducing	
corruption	 in	 the	North	 and	dealing	with	 patterns	 of	 corporate	
control	 of	 governance	 and	 decision-making	 there	 in	 order	 to	
make	a	 substantive	global	 contribution	 that	would	help	 further	




agents—colonialism—play	 in	 fostering	 “national”	 patterns	 of	
corruption.	 	 	 In	 the	 final	 analysis,	 it	 is	 not	 a	 matter	 of	 simple	
transparency	 or	 good	 governance,	 or	 even	 of	 replacing	 venal	
government	officials,	but	of	demanding	sustainable	justice	in	the	
broader	 global	 context,	 recognising	 the	 inherent	 inequalities	 in	
the	international	trade	and	financial	system.
A	peoples’	 development	 agenda	would	begin	by	 exposing	 that	
“trade	 liberalisation”	 is	 in	 fact	 corrupt	 and	 anti-development,	
entailing	many	times	the	loss	of	control	over	local	resources,	capital	
and	indeed	sovereignty.		In	South	America	we	are	witnessing	the	






regard,	 as	 are	 the	Commercial	 Peoples	Agreements	 signed	with	
Venezuela	upholding	trade	concessions	based	on	solidarity.
Action	 is	urgently	 required	 to	plug	 the	 leaks	by	which	capital	 is	
flowing	 from	 South	 to	 North.	 	 South	 governments	 need	 to	 be	
pushed	(by	their	own	people,	not	by	expatriate	NGOs)	to	repudiate	
debts,	 better	 control	 and	 reverse	 the	 liberalisation	 of	 capital	
accounts	and	re-impose	domestic	performance	requirements	and	
profit	repatriation	restrictions	on	foreign	investment.	Campaigns	
need	 to	 work	 for	 the	 elimination	 of	 bank	 secrecy,	 the	 closing	
down	 of	 tax	 havens,	 and	 actions	 against	 financial	 institutions,	




of	 it	 illegal.	 	Reversing	 the	flight	of	capital	and	 reigning	 in	TNCs	
should	be	key	anti-corruption	concerns.
Further,	 if	 people	 link	 corruption	 to	 their	 own	 hunger	 and	
impoverishment,	an	anti-corruption	campaign	must	do	so	also.	This	
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is	precisely	why	an	effective	strategy	would	go	beyond	a	simple	
manipulation	 of	 anger	 for	 electoral	 reasons	 or	 mobilisation	 for	
mobilisations’	sake.		The	point	is	to	conceive	and	work	not	simply	
around	programmes	 and	politics,	 but	 to	 change	 the	 realities	 of	
life.	 	For	people	to	react	not	only	to	the	petty	corruption	that	so	
often	 surrounds	 them,	 but	 also	 to	 make	 the	 connections	 with	




groups	 working	 on	 development	 finance,	 debt,	 governance,	
transparency	and	corruption	 issues.	 	 	This	 is	 a	necessary	 step	 in	
the	direction	of	elaborating	joint	political	strategies.	 	 	The	 issues	




our	 civil	 society	 organisations,	 reviewing	 our	 own	 levels	 of	
transparency	 and	 integrity.	 	 Then	 and	 only	 are	 we	 morally	
and	 organisationally	 equipped	 to	 identify	 and	 act	 upon	 more	
fundamental	 questions,	 i.e.	 to	 ask	 what	 drives	 individuals	 to	
commit,	 partake	 in	 or	 tolerate	 acts	 of	 corruption,	 and	 what	
motivates	 others	 to	 take	 action,	 to	 demand	 good	 government	
and	 partake	 in	 it.	 	 How	 does	 the	 presence	 of	 the	 chronically	
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The dominant definition and framework for the analysis
of corruption – which then informs or misleads the ways
to address corruption -- is much too narrow a definition
and itself a construct of the systemic abuse of economic
power as it presents itself today in the world. Ours is a
global justice perspective and our objective is to place
corruption in the contemporary context of corporate
globalization. We wish to reach important constituencies
outraged about corruption and help channel that
understanding into a broader movement that tackles
corruption at the root and structural level, and not simply
in a few corporate-friendly limited expressions.
We view corruption as a process facilitated by institutions
and economic interests, and not simply single acts
by single individuals chiefly in the South. With this in
mind, we articulate a broader and more contemporary
understanding of corruption that can help people,
victims in particular, account for many of the daily
economic injustices suffered.
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